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Delaware’s Politics 
 
Abstract 
 
Delaware makes the corporate law governing most large American corporations.  
Since Washington can take away any, or all, of that lawmaking, a deep conception of 
American  corporate  law  should  show  how,  when,  and  where  Washington  leaves 
lawmaking authority in state hands, and how it affects what the states do.  
The  interest  groups  and  ideas  in  play  in  Delaware  are  narrow,  the  array  in 
Congress  wide.  Three  key  public  choice  results  emanate  from  this  difference.  First, 
interest groups powerful enough to dominate Delaware lawmaking forgo a winner-take-
all strategy because federal players may act if they see state results as lopsided. Second, 
the  major  state-level  players  usually  want  to  minimize  federal  authority  in  making 
corporate law, because a local deal cuts in fewer players; a federal deal splits the pie with 
outsiders. Third, we can delineate the space where the states have room to maneuver from 
where they risk federal action.   
Delaware law typically represents the status quo.  It’s when its law is the first on 
the groundas it often is because the federal agenda is large and Delaware’s small—
that it gains most of its discretion vis-à-vis the federal authorities. When it moves first, 
especially when its two main playersmanagers and investorsagree on what to do, it 
sets the initial content of American corporate law. Federal authorities might then change 
the  state-made  result,  and  players  and  ideologies  absent  in  Delaware  but  big  in 
Washington  affect  the  federal  result.  Those  new  players  and  ideas  give  the  original 
Delaware players reason to resist federal action. Doctrines that limit federal effort are 
public-regarding justifications for deferring to interests that prevail on the state level.  But 
when Delaware cannot act first—either because media saliency puts the matter on the 
federal agenda or because its primary players disagree—Delaware loses its dominance. 
I  analogize  the  relationship  between  Delaware  and  Congress  to  that  between 
federal  agencies  and  Congress.  Federal  agencies  have  discretion  and  first-mover 
advantages, but their independence even when wide is not without limits, ending when 
they provoke Congress.  So it is with Delaware. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate law analysts have grappled with the nature of interstate competition 
for corporate charters since the large modern corporation appeared a century ago. Are 
states racing to the bottom, demeaning the public interest by pandering to firms and 
their organizers, just to sell corporate charters for a few dollars?  Or are they racing to 
the top, competing to make better corporate law, like businesses struggling to sell a 
better product?  As important as the race might be, I argue that its directionto the top 
or the bottommay well be no more important to the content of American corporate 
law than Delaware’s relationship to the federal government. Here, I analyze the public 
choice structure of that federal-state relationship. 
Delaware writes most state corporate law.  Yet Washington can take away all of 
Delaware’s corporate law. Because Washington has this power, the principles, political 
interests, and institutional structures that determine what it takes over, and what it 
leaves alone, influence the shape, content, and scope of American corporate law. And 
Delaware’s  scope,  freedom,  and  power  is  similar  to,  albeit  wider  than,  the  scope, 
freedom, and power of federal agencies, which Congress can control. Even if Congress 
doesn’t act day-to-day, the parameters of Delaware’s freedom to act are potentially 
defined by Congress, as they are for federal agencies. 
The private interests and the conceptions of the public interest in play at the state 
level differ from those in play at the federal level. How the two levels interact can 
determine  whose  interests  and  which  ideas  dominate  American  corporate  law. 
Delaware in effect provides a caucus for managers and investors, yielding a status quo 
that federal authorities could later change.  When Delaware fears a federal trump, 
Washington  can  affect  what  it  does.  When  it  acts  in  a  way  both  managers  and 
shareholders find satisfactory, it resembles a caucus.  Neither calls on Congress to act, 
and federal policymakers find it hard to put the issue on the congressional agenda. 
And, when Congress is quiet, broad political concerns stay out of American corporate 
law. 
Delaware’s  primary  interest  groups  are  shareholders  and  managers.    One 
common  view  is  that  managers  and  insiders  have  the  upper  hand  in  determining 
Delaware’s corporate law. Even if true, we’d want to explain why Delaware doesn’t 
always capitulate to them. The federal overlay helps us to understand why.  Delaware 
                                                            
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Thanks for comments, early discussion, and in two cases 
research assistance go to Barry Adler, Stacy Anderson, David Baron, Michal Barzuza, Keith Bishop, Mihir 
Desai, Einer Elhauge, David Epstein, Merritt Fox, Jack Goldsmith, Jeffrey Gordon, Mattias Geise, Victor 
Goldberg,  Andrew  Guzman,  Howell  Jackson,  Michael  Levine,  Saul  Levmore,  Ehud  Kamar,  Jonathan 
Macey, Curtis Milhaupt, Katharina Pistor, Todd Rakoff, Mark Ramseyer, Pierre Salmon, Alan Schwartz, 
Matthew  Stephenson,  Leo  Strine,  William  Stuntz,  Pierre  Salmon,  Guhan  Subramanian,  and  workshop 
participants at Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Vanderbilt, and Yale.  And thanks go to Harvard Law School’s 
Olin Center for financial and research support. DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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could  goad  federal  policymakers  into  acting.  An  unbalanced  state  result,  or  a 
disgruntled state-level loser, would make federal action more likely. That possibility 
pushes Delaware to arbitrate—often via fair-minded judges—between its two main 
groups, not just because it’s plausible policy, but also because to do so gives good 
cover if corporate law gets onto the federal agenda. 
Federal authorities, Congress in particular, can crush Delaware. Yet they don’t. 
We need to explain when, where, and why Delaware gets autonomy, and what the 
limits  of  that  autonomy  are.  At  times  Congress,  subject  to  wider  interests  than  is 
Delaware, takes over corporate lawmaking.  Can we draw the parameters that delineate 
where and when it acts?   
Because  Delaware  can  often  act  first,  its  interest  groups  can  create  a  fait 
accompli that differs from what Congress would do if it had acted first.  They just can’t 
move so far and so vividly that they goad Congress to act. And, even if elements in 
Congress stir, since Congress usually needs to be pushed to act; if the two primary 
groups favor the status quo, Congress may acquiesce. When Delaware acts slowly—
because, say, its primary interest groups disagree, or the correct policy resolution is 
unclear, or scandals call for quick action and Congress moves faster than Delaware—
then Delaware’s agenda-setting authority ends, its autonomy shrinks, and American 
corporate law goes national. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002Congress’s response to 
the Enron-class scandalsis the latest such instance. 
*   *   * 
We can build this federal-state public choice story from the ground up, with 
Delaware’s  franchise  tax  as  the  foundation.  The  tax  is  the  prize  for  winning  the 
interstate race, with many seeing it as bonding Delaware to make good corporate law. 
But bonding isn’t the whole story: The tax shapes who counts in making American 
corporate law. It enhances managers’ and shareholders’ joint authority—they’re the 
players who can take that $500 million annual pot of gold away from Delaware—while 
demeaning  outsiders’  influence.  Those  outsiders  often  have  a  regulatory  agenda.  
Excluding  them  weakens  that  agenda,  making  possible  a  contractarian  model  to 
American corporate law. National ideologies and policy goals of enhancing capital 
markets and competition (potentially at the expense of managers and shareholders), or 
of  fostering  a  populist-style  leveling  of  corporate  authority,  have  little  weight  in 
Delaware because they do not directly threaten the franchise tax. Congress though is 
not so limited, and these ideas weigh more in Congress than in Delaware. 
Traditional analyses look at who, between managers and shareholders, has more 
muscle in bestowing those franchise tax revenues on Delaware, through their ability to 
control reincorporation decisions. These inquiries are important, but incomplete.  Both 
managers and shareholders—and no one else—must approve reincorporation for firms 
to move out of or into Delaware. Thus I reinterpret the franchise tax in public choice 
terms: it empowers managers’ and shareholders’ interests in Delaware, and denigrates 
everyone  else’s.  It  sets,  or  helps  to  set,  the  initial  agenda  for  making  American 
corporate law. If a rule works for managers and shareholders, it’ll fly in Delaware. If a 
proposed rule offends them both, it won’t.  
*   *   * DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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The role of the federal lawmaker differs in each view of the race. In the typical 
race-to-the-top  view,  the  federal  lawmaker  is  a  monopolist,  unconstrained  by 
competition. It adapts less well than do competing states because it doesn’t get signals 
and  pressures  from  other  jurisdictions.  In  the  typical  race-to-the-bottom  view,  the 
federal lawmaker, unconcerned with losing franchise tax revenue, acts in the public 
interest. 
But the basic issue here is not, or not just, federal monopoly vs. state-to-state 
competition.  Differing  results  would  arise  even  if  both  primary  lawmakers—
Washington  and  Delaware—had  monopolies  in  their  spheres,  i.e.,  even  if  no  state 
competed with Delaware. The key issue here is who makes federal law and who makes 
state—even a monopoly-state’s—law. More players have voice and power in Congress 
than  in  Delaware.  Competition  and  monopoly  are  not  the  only  determinants;  the 
differing public choice array may well be as important. 
In Part I, I review the race literature and show how a full story must bring in the 
federal  authorities.  I  conclude  Part  I  by  analogizing  Delaware  to  the  so-called 
independent agency:  it appears to be a free agent, but it is free only so long as it does 
not provoke Congress.   
In Part II, I examine the interest groups behind the institutional structure.  The 
interest groups in play differ at each level:  shareholders and managers at the state 
level, and a wider array at the federal level. First, even if a player dominates Delaware, 
Congress can trump Delaware, and an unbalanced result there can attract attention. 
That prospect alone induces Delaware not to give either side full victory. Second, and 
more importantly, shareholders and managers—often at odds in the race literature—
usually both want to deter federal authorities from intervening.  Federal action will 
bring to the table other players who are cut out in Delaware. Ideologies also differ: 
some  federal  public  policymakers  have  competition  and  strong  capital  markets  in 
mind. Others seek a populist power-leveling. Neither ideology is important to most 
Delaware  playerse.  I  end  Part  II  by  returning  to  Delaware’s  similarity  to  the 
independent agency, analogizing its corporate lawmaking to Federal Reserve monetary 
policy: an independent agency  with expertise, but one susceptible to congressional 
influence. 
In Part III, I look at situations most likely to induce federal action:  scandals and 
poor economic performance. Scandals and economic weakness signal that something 
could have gone wrong with the normal science of corporate lawmaking. The system 
gives an incentive—albeit a weak one—for Delaware and its interest groups to make 
corporate law close enough to the national interest that it survives federal scrutiny 
when scandal or economic reversal hit the headlines. 
In  Part  IV,  I  compare  and  contrast  Delaware  with  the  federal  agencies.  I 
analogize the signals that induce Congress to displace the agenciesfire alarms from 
debacles  and  police  patrols  that  uncover  problemsto  the  signals  in  corporate 
governance  that  induce  it  to  displace  the  states  in  corporate  law.  I  also  compare 
Delaware’s independence to that of the federal agencies; it is as independent as any of 
them, actually much more so, and the controls Congress has over federal agencies are 
stronger than those it has over Delaware.  But Congress can control the corporate law 
results if it wants; and at critical times it has. DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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In Part V, I relate this analysis to key theoretical issues. I show how this federal-
state structure makes corporate law’s contractarian paradigmthat corporate law is, or 
should be, the contract that investors and managers wantplausible.  The internal 
affairs  normthat  states  should  make  the  rules  governing  a  corporation’s  internal 
relationshipsis  a  public-regarding  concept  that,  when  respected,  limits  federal 
interest groups and ideologies from shaping American corporate law.  
Then  in Part VI,  I  look  briefly  at  causality,  asking  whether  it’s  the  federal-
Delaware structure that produces American corporate law, or whether that structure 
persists because of a polity dedicated to property-oriented corporate law. That is, the 
Delaware-federal relationship, in stabilizing a conservative corporate law, may be the 
kind of institution that a conservative, property-oriented polity would set up to steady 
corporate law expectations.  The polity might have built an independent agency for the 
task, but since chance events set up a state with roughly the same functionality, then it 
has little reason to alter the accidental institutional arrangement. 
Finally,  I  conclude.  For  too  long  the  interstate  race  has  been  corporate  law 
scholars’ sole institutional focus. But it’s not the only governmental relationship that 
counts. The public choice differences between Delaware and Washington are large and 
key to understanding American corporate law. They are in the abstract as important to 
the making of American corporate law as that interstate race.  Maybe more so. 
 
I.  THE RACE 
 
Corporate  law,  according  to  longstanding  academic  tradition,  is  made  in  a 
marketone of competing states.  
 
A. States Fight for Chartering Revenues 
 
States,  eager  in  the  race-to-the-bottom  view  to  grab  the  franchise  tax  from 
corporations, seek to please the managers of large firms by making corporate law that 
maximizes managers’ wealth and discretion.
1  In the contrasting race-to-the-top view, 
states that burden their firms’ operations raise those firms’ capital costs, as eventually 
capital markets see that the firms are weaker and earn less than similar firms from 
states with better corporate law.  Over the long-run, managers realize that they would 
weaken their firms by reincorporating into those bad-law states, the pot for managers 
and  shareholders  to  split  would  shrink,  and  hence  competitive  markets  push  the 
corporate players to move to states with better corporate law.
2  Bad corporate law 
                                                            
1 The classic statement is still William Cary’s, written after he finished chairing the SEC. William 
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 701 (1974).  See also 
Lucian Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate 
Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992). 
2 Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 21 (1993); 
Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s 
Corporation Law, 76 NW. U.L. REV. 913 (1982).  Parallel political science work has powerful political 
centers damaging markets, while peripheral but competing political entities keep them. Barry R. Weingast, DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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might persist in a state, but one way or another the firms incorporated under that bad 
law would not. 
 
B. The Federal Trump 
 
Federal authorities can, and do, confine state competition.  They often make 
rulessuch as vast parts of the securities lawsthat are functionally part of America’s 
corporate law.  They could do more, were they so inclined.  In nearly every decade of 
the twentieth century the decade’s major corporate law issue either went federal or 
federal authorities threatened to take it over—from early 20
th century merger policy, to 
the 1930’s securities laws, to the 1950’s proxy fights, to the 1960’s Williams Act, to 
the 1970’s going private transactions.  That history gives Delaware good reason to fear 
federal preemption on big issues, and it’s often shown itself to be aware that federal 
authorities might act.  Even when it just reacts to national public opinion, it thereby 
suppresses its usual local contractarian mode for the larger concerns more common on 
the  national  level.  Elsewhere  I  analyzed  the  frequency  of  federal  action  and  of 
Delaware’s consciousness that it risks federal action.
3 
 
C. Delaware as a Quasi-Federal Agency 
 
Let’s drop the strong focus on state competition, for now, in these pages. It’s not 
that the race has no import, but that it’s not the only interjurisdictional game that 
counts.  So, to ease our task, let’s just examine the relationship between Delaware and 
the  federal  authorities  and  at  a  later  time  analyze  the  interaction  between  the  two 
games.
4   Posit that Delaware wins a state-to-state race.  No longer tightly confined by 
closely competing states, it has slack.
5 Then ask what it’s relationship would be with 
Congress. Think of Delaware as similar to a federal agency making corporate law.  If 
we think this way, a new picture for corporate lawmaking emerges in the foreground: 
the dominant relationship in the sketch becomes not the horizontal one of the states 
competing, nor even of Delaware as a pure monopolist, but the vertical one of a vast 
                                                                                                                                                   
The economic role of political institutions: Market-preserving federalism and economic development, 11 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995). 
3 Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003). Others pointed to federal 
authority as tempering the race, although often dismissing its strength and persistence, or limiting its scope 
to one area of corporate lawmaking.  William W. Bratton, Corporate Law’s Race to Nowhere in Particular, 
44 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 419 (1994); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate Federalism: State 
Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 
759, 768 (1987); Melvin Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1512 
(1989); Arthur Fleischer, Jr., “Federal Corporation Law”: An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965) 
(federal  disclosure  rules  control  fiduciary  behavior);  Mark  J.  Roe,  Takeover  Politics,  in  THE  DEAL 
DECADE 321, 340–47 (Margaret Blair ed., 1993) (federal influence on Delaware in making takeover law). 
4 See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Advantage (working paper in progress, 2005). 
5 Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 679 (2002). 
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federal authority that could, and occasionally does, displace the lawmaking of the little 
states below it.  
I sketch that picture in the rest of this article. Instead of seeing corporate law as 
made in state-to-state close combat, imaginein extreme contrastthat much of the 
time  only  Delaware  and  Washington  count.  Delaware  usually  sets  the  status  quo. 
Federal lawmakers can then overturn what Delaware does. Usually they don’t, but they 
always  could,  and  that  possibility  limits  state  power  in  making  corporate  law. 
Delaware has autonomy, but only if it doesn’t goad the federal behemoth. If we can 
conceptualize the bases for when and why federal authorities displace Delaware, we 
will have gone a long way to understanding the fundamental structure of American 
corporate law. 
Thus Delaware could be reconceptualized as the first drafter of corporate law 
rules, with a dormant Washington having the Commerce Clause power to reject those 
drafts if roused. Or it could be an independent federal agency that national players 
could  rein  in  via  an  act  of  Congress,  via  a  stranglehold  from  a  congressional 
committee, via the SEC inducing new stock exchange rules, or via a pointed inquiry 
from the White House.  True, because Delaware is more independent than even the 
most independent federal agencies, we have to temper that analogy, or focus on the 
most independent of those agencies, like the Federal Reserve.  This we do below. 
Delaware could also be reconceptualized as a natural monopolist subject to a 
regulator’s  oversightwith  Congress  as  that  regulator.  Or  it  could  be  seen  as  a 
monopolist whose limit pricing deters entry.   
Delaware’s freedom to act and its limits are not determined solely, and perhaps 
not even primarily, by its efficiency vis-à-vis other states, but by the line demarcating 
where the federal authorities leave it alone and where they won’t. It has reason to 
position itself so as not to threaten the federal actors.  And it does.  Within the area that 
doesn’t threaten federal authorities, it has autonomy.  And our job here is to see where 
and when that slack exists, and how and why federal authorities pull it taut. 
 
II.    MAKING  AMERICAN  CORPORATE  LAW:  DIFFERING  IDEAS, 
DIFFERING INTERESTS 
 
Delaware  responds  primarily  and  directly  to  managers  and  investors.  The 
stability of the corporate enterprise and of the incumbent actors is uppermost in the 
Delaware decisionmakers’ minds. Congress though deals with more interest groups 
and has a conception of the public interest wider than just boardroom stability and 
shareholder relations. 
 
A. In Delaware: The Franchise Tax 
 
Delaware,  in  the  usual  view,  draws  lines  and  rules  between  managers  and 
shareholders.  The  franchise-tax  pot,  which  accounts  for  about  20%  of  the  state’s 
revenue, motivates its line-drawing. In the race-to-the-top view, Delaware must draw 
that line efficiently for capital markets or it’ll lose the franchise tax; in the race-to-the-
bottom  view,  managers  get  more  because  they  have  more  control  over  the DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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reincorporation  decisionand  hence  more  control  over  that  pot  of  goldthan 
shareholders. 
The franchise tax doesn’t just motivate Delaware in drawing the line between 
managers and shareholders, but also keeps out the other players. Why? Managers and 
shareholders,  if  united,  can  deny  Delaware  that  franchise  tax  bonanza.  No  one  in 
Delaware has that power. Only federal action can overcome the two primary Delaware 
players. Hence, the (until-now-unseen?) first effect of the franchise tax is not just to 
affect who wins between managers and shareholders, but to decide who gets to play. 
Managers and shareholders get to play. No one else does.   
Consider these observations from an astute Delaware player: 
Delaware  corporate  lawmak[ers]  …  [are]  acutely  sensitive  to 
constituency input.  [They] amend the corporate law rapidly when there 
is a demonstrable [corporate] consensus … . [T]his process breaks down 
when Delaware’s corporate constituency is divided … . [Yes,] Delaware 
responds reflexively to corporate managers, but ... [i]f Delaware law does 
not … protect[] … investors … it will eventually lose its dominance.   
… [And i]n areas where a consensus emerges that there is a need for 
greater  clarity  or  certainty,  Delaware's  Corporate  Law  Council  will 
generally  draft  and  obtain  swift  passage  of  legislative  amendments.  
When there is no consensus, however, they will not.
6  
The  general  polity  is  not  usually  involved  in  Delaware,  even  though  the 
corporation affects parties beyond managers and investors. Employees or their unions 
can be interested in corporate law. Public interest groups of all stripes want to confine 
or  channel  corporate  power.  Financial  institutions  as  creditors  want  to  influence 
corporate  law  (usually  to  induce  greater  stability)  and  in  other  nations  they  are 
heavyweights  in  making  corporate  law.  Not  one  of  these  four  interests  strongly 
influences day-to-day American corporate lawmaking. 
Why they don’t lobby Delaware is worth investigating, although I don’t here. 
They might believe they couldn’t outbid a united managerial-investor lobbying group. 
Or  they  might  believe  that  no  amount  of  normal  lobbying  could  overcome  the 
Delaware polity’s goal of keeping that franchise tax bonanza; since they can’t get to 
the minimum ante$500 million annuallythey might think, why even try to lobby 
Delaware?  And even if they did lobby successfully, they should expect to see firms 
slip away, exiting Delaware for a friendlier state. Whatever the explanation, we can 
observe that these groups don’t influence Delaware corporate law directly. 
General public opinion—important to senators running for re-election—is only a 
distant, indirect concern for the Delaware chancellor or legislator. National opinion 
polls might sway a president or senator worried about his or her overall program, or re-
election.    But  Delaware  players  can  disregard  a  national  opinion  poll  about,  say, 
executive compensation.  When national opinion flares up and influences the Delaware 
decisionmakers, we may be seeing indirect federal influence at work, as Delaware 
                                                            
6  Cf.  Leo  E.  Strine,  Jr.,  Delaware’s  Corporate-Law  System:  Is  Corporate  America  Buying  an 
Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1268-70 (2001).  Leo Strine is a 
sitting vice chancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court. DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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suppresses its local contractarian model to avoid offending national opinion that might 
spur change from the top. 
And national institutions attuned to the functioning of key parts of the American 
economy, institutions such as the Federal Reserve, the Council of Economic Advisors, 
Congress’s General Accounting Office, and the SEC, are weighty at the federal level; 
there’s nothing analogous in Delaware. Such public institutions, staffed by people with 
policy ideas and influenced by national interest groups, don’t influence the Delaware 
legislature directly; Delaware has built no regulatory agencies that regularize public-
oriented  inputs.  Its  mode  of  regulationex  post  fiduciary  duties,  not  constant 
oversightreflects the desires of Delaware’s key interest groups. Others might want 
continuous  regulation,  but  neither  populists  nor  economists  count  for  much  in 
Delaware. 
The structure of Delaware corporate lawmaking doesn’t bring in other groups.  
Bar advisory committees do propel the Delaware legislature, but the Delaware bar 
typically represents managers and investors (as well as themselves).  Judges need a 
case or controversy in order to act, and it’s the corporate players who have standing to 
sue, not the broader public.  No regulatory agency makes forward-looking rules in 
Delaware. No Delaware prosecutor scrutinizes corporate America to throw wrongdoers 
in jail. Delaware could build a prosecutorial office or a regulatory agency to empower 
other interests or ideas, but it hasn’t.  
Hence, one could say that investors and managers make Delaware corporate 
law,  and  that  they  bring  in  the  Delaware  judgesselected  by  bar  committeesto 
arbitrate their disputes.  Other groups and visions are weaker there than they would be 
in an attentive federal forum. Delaware lawmakers do not have to placate employees or 
environmentalists or those with an affirmative-action agenda. Delaware citizens who 
might side with such interests see the financial import of the corporate industry to 
Delaware, so their dissenting views fade and politicians can ignore them. Nor need 
Delaware players consider policymakers’ views of what kind of corporate law or what 
allocation  of  investor-manager  authority  is  best  for  the  American  economy.  Stated 
bluntly, if Delaware made corporate law that simultaneously offended investors and 
managers, then those players, who jointly fully control the reincorporation decision, 
could take the big franchise tax pot of money away from Delaware.
7 For Delaware in 
the long run, and perhaps even in the short run, everything else is secondary. 
 
B. In Congress 
 
Switch  to  Washington.  In  Congress,  the  range  of  interests  with  the  clout  to 
influence policy widens beyond just investors and managers. And some of these wider 
interests would want to use corporate law to implement their public-regarding visions 
                                                            
7 More precisely, firms would exit if Delaware offended two groups of managers:  those managing 
firms and those running stockholding institutions.  The Delaware deal may not correspond to what ultimate 
investors would agree to with industrial managers.  It is what investors’ two types of managers—financial 
and industrial—want.  See Roe, Delaware’s Advantage, supra note 4. DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
 
9
for the corporation.  Their agenda would often be contrary to the interests of managers 
and shareholders.  
It’s  not  that  these  outside  groups  could  readily  beat  a  managerial-investor 
alliance.  Ordinarily,  they  couldn’t.  They’re  too  weak.  But  if  one-half  of  that 
managerial-investor  alliance  successfully  allied  with  an  otherwise  out-group—with, 
say,  populists,  public  policymakers  or  other  national  interest  groups—American 
corporate law wouldn’t be what it is today. In Delaware, those other allies are nowhere 
to be found, but in Congress they count and could crack open a manager-investor 
alliance. 
Here’s how a Delaware-style coalition could come apart in Congress: Imagine 
lawmakers  are  reviewing  rules  that  would  make  managers  more  autonomous  from 
shareholders. In Delaware the managers and institutional shareholders work out a deal 
between themselves. Or one—typically managers—completely gets its way.   
But in Congress, the players and ideas differ. Managers and employees might 
ally to confine shareholder power. In a national democratic forum, managers might 
want an ally with many votes.
8 In a small local forum like Delaware that depends on 
corporate tax revenues, managers don’t need those votes and, because employees in 
Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  don’t  vote  in  Delaware,  can’t  get  them  anyway.
9  Interest 
groups that can’t take the franchise tax away from Delaware still can play a role in 
Congress.  The AFL-CIO comes to mind, as do public interest lobbying groups.
10 
Or consider the alliances shareholders might try to make in Congress, alliances 
impossible to forge in Delaware. Shareholder activists might want rules to get them 
into the boardrooms.  In Delaware, they’d have to make a deal with managers to get 
anywhere in the legislature. But in Congress, shareholder activists  might ally with 
public interest activists who also want to confine managerial discretion. The two might 
unite to push for a law by which the first would get three seats and the latter one seat 
on the boards of major American firms.
11 
True,  financial  shareholders  prefer  pure  shareholder  primacy;  they’d  initially 
oppose any other group getting into the boardroom. But they’d need a coalition to get 
enough votes to win. In crude terms, rational shareholders might give something up to 
environmentalists, if they gave up less to them than they got back from managers. 
While this kind of coalition-building is hard in Congress, it’s impossible in Delaware.  
                                                            
8 Cf. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is There Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test 
Using  Takeover  Legislation,  30  RAND  J.  ECON.  535  (1999)  (wages  higher  in  states  with  stronger, 
managerial-favoring antitakeover laws). 
9 Cf. William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715, 757  (1998) 
(“shifting [corporate] lawmaking to [Washington would facilitate] … interest group rent-seeking [because 
Congress] is not constrained by the same competitive forces constraining state lawmakers”).  Note that the 
AFL-CIO as stockholder could and probably does influence Delaware. 
10 By the late 1970s, political scientists “began to notice new phenomena—a proliferation of ‘public 
interest’ … groups that monitored and publicized congressional behavior, [and] the growing … role of 
PACs … .” Morris P. Fiorina, Afterword (But Undoubtedly Not the Last Word), in POSITIVE THEORIES OF 
CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS 303, 309 (Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, eds. 1995).  
11 See the discussion of the shareholder access debate infra note 52 & accompanying text. DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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More goes on in Washington than wider coalition possibilities. Public-regarding 
policymakers in Washington see themselves as custodians for the overall health of the 
American economy; they could conclude that tight managerial accountabilitybeyond 
that  which  even  interests  institutional  investorswould  be  best  for  the  economy. 
Congress wants strong capital markets and a healthy economy. The White House’s 
Council of Economic Advisors influences the President, the GAO writes reports, and 
the  SEC  often  proposes  rules  that  managers  and  institutional  investors  dislike.  Of 
course we shouldn’t naïvely think that interests don’t influence these players too, but 
the types of interests differ from Delaware’s and sometimes the players have enough 
slack to be able to act on their ideological preferences. Public-regarding views can 
influence  Congress  when  public  servants  at  the  SEC,  the  GAO,  the  Council  of 
Economic Advisors, or the Federal Reserve weigh in. None of these players has the 
same clout in Delaware. 
Public-regarding need not, as I am using it here, be identical to being in the 
public interest. Congress might react to headlines, might want to be seen as acting on 
the  volatile  issues  of  the  day,  and  might  not  have  long-term  national  well-being 
uppermost in mind. Reaching toward the public interest is only a subset of public-
regarding  actions.  Nevertheless,  two  broad  currents  of  thinking  can  flood  through 
Washington and carry Congress away:  populist public opinion and public-interested 
thinking. Neither is as important in Delaware.
12 
Thus we have our first result in the federal-state interplay. The interests and 
ideas at the two levels differ. Two main interests are in play in Delaware, and they’d 
usually like to have rules made in the arena where jointly they have more power. One 
might dominate in that arena, but usually doesn’t. The possibility that Washington is 
more likely to act if Delaware seems unbalanced or that the loser in Delaware could 
move the rulemaking to Washington constrains the dominant Delaware player from 
pursuing a winner-take-all strategy.  It wants to minimize the chances that Congress, 
with its own motivations and interest groups, takes notice of the issue, or that the loser 
appeals to Congress.  The state’s ideas soften, its preferences widen beyond a high 
regard for boardroom stability, and ideas that arise in the federal arena spill over into 
Delaware.  Delaware has reason to be wary of moving into territory where Congress 
would act. So, our next task is to find the concepts that define those boundaries.  
 
 III.  SEQUENCE 
 
A. Abstractions 
 
1.  The  narrow  result  when  Delaware  acts.    Managers  and  shareholders 
obviously have much in common.  When their interests coincide, they get what they 
                                                            
12 “[W]hen issues are unidimensional and … salient … , the chamber-committee [read: Congress-
Delaware] congruence in expressed preferences is especially high. [But] when issues are multidimensional 
and  are  not  salient  [in  Congress],  committees  [i.e.,  Delaware  players]  are  relatively  autonomous  and 
congruences in expressed preferences [between Congress and Delaware]… are low.”  Forrest Maltzman & 
Steven S. Smith, Principals, Goals, Dimensionality, and Congressional Committees, in POSITIVE THEORIES 
OF CONGRESSIONAL INSTITUTIONS 253, 257 (Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, eds. 1995). DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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want in Delaware.
13  Presumably they can often succeed directly in Washington too, 
without Delaware as a first “caucus.”  Even so, they would be wary of Washington, 
where they’d have to pay to pacify the national interests who’d want something from 
the corporationeven if it’s only by giving up something elsewhere on their agenda to 
push the corporate law that they want through Congress.  
This simple result tells us a lot about Delaware’s importance.  While I spend 
more  time  here  abstracting  contested  corporate  law  issueswhat  happens  when 
managers and investors disagreethe basic public choice result is straightforward:  
Managers  and  investors  have  much  in  common  and  powerful  incentives  to  work 
together in Delaware.  When their interests coincide, or are close, it’s easy to see why 
they prefer Delaware to Washington. 
*   *   * 
Consider next what happens when they disagree and how the federal presence 
moderates Delaware.  Even then the primary players  have reason to find common 
ground and position themselves and Delaware to reduce the chance of federal action.  
Suppose Delaware is to decide an issue of managerial autonomy. Figure 1 illustrates a 
spectrum of autonomy.  The right side is profit-oriented, representing only that much 
autonomy  that  produces  profits;  the  left  side  is  maximum  managerial  autonomy.  
Assume for now that Delaware favors managers, as represented by the point on the 
left,  D.  Were  the  policy  arena  purely  local,  managers  could  take  it  all  and  get 
Delaware’s law to reflect managers’ preference.
14 
 
                   
Figure 1. One Issue in Delaware 
A more realistic illustration would draw in Delaware’s corporate industry:  the 
lawyers,  government  officials,  and  others  who  profit  from  Delaware’s  corporate 
business.
15  Much Delaware corporate law reflects the interests of Delaware corporate 
lawyers.  And it would more realistically recognize that Delaware pays attention to 
what other states are doing.  But we leave these factors out of the picture to begin 
simply, and then add federal influence.  
And, yes, it’s not just the legislature that makes Delaware law, but also its courts 
and  its  bar  association  committees  that  recommend  results  to  the  legislature.  We 
simplify  here  too,  collapsing  all  of  Delaware’s  lawmaking  institutions  into  its 
legislature. Its judges cannot persistently offend the legislature; the legislature appoints 
the judges, whose propensity to play ball is known when they’re appointed. They’re 
vetted by bar association committees and have a prior career.  Similarly, the SEC and 
federal authorities make federal law, but they cannot stray too far from congressional 
                                                            
13 Cf. Strine, supra note 6, at 1268-70.  
14 I start with the race-to-the-bottom view, that Delaware panders to managers, and show how the 
federal presence can limit that race. The federal overhang can analogously restrict a race-to-the-top.  See 
Figures 7 and 8. 
15 Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate 
Law, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 469 (1987). DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
 
12
 
will.  Those who want federal action might not run right to Congress directly, but to 
the SEC or the NYSE.  This doesn’t change the analysis.  The SEC is Congress’s 
creation. The NYSE can beas Congress has commandedindirectly controlled by 
the SEC.  We thus simplify lawmaking to two bodies:  The Delaware legislature and 
the United States Congress, each with loosely controlled affiliates. 
2. The wide space in which Congress acts.  Congress is more heterogeneous 
than Delaware. Managers and investors are important, but others also have clout. For a 
few in Congress, managers and investors are minor constituents. Broader concepts—of 
populism and of a public-regarding effort to maximize corporate productivity—are 
more strongly in play. To keep the image of an abstract policy space manageable, let’s 
add to the congressional agenda just the two ideologies—populism and productivity—
and associate some interest groups with them.  
Begin with public policymakers by considering Figure 2. Managerial autonomy 
increases  on  the  x-axis,  productivity  on  the  y-axis.  We  start  at  the  origin  with 
satisfactory productivity, at, say, 80% of what’s technically possible. More managerial 
autonomy  initially  increases  efficiency,  because  managers  need  more  freedom  to 
maneuver, to decide, and to take risks. But too much autonomy eventually isolates 
them from outside pressures. Corporate productivity declines. The curve rises, peaks, 
and then falls.  The space inside the parabola is attainable in the economy; the space 
outside it is not. We posit public policymakers who seek to maximize productivity, do 
so capably, and are free enough from interest pressures that they can act on their own 
preferences. They prefer the maximum attainable corporate productivity, at point P.  
Self-seeking managers seek autonomy, at point M.  Investors want profits. 
   
 
Figure 2.  The Trade-off of Autonomy and Efficiency
16 
Under the federal policymakers’ preferred policy, P, profits might not be as high 
as at other points on the parabola, and so shareholders would not want exactly what 
policymakers  want.  Profits  and  productivity  are  not  identical.  (Think  of  cartel 
arrangements and monopolies, which raise profits but are not necessarily efficient.) 
Moreover,  managers  run  institutional  investors,  not  the  ultimate  stockholders.  
                                                            
16  I’ve blanched out much from firms and politics to get us to a two-dimensional graphic.  If the 
graphic doesn’t quite seem vivid on the Autonomy dimension, replace it with Executive Pay. DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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Policymakers might want engaged investors sitting in corporate boardrooms, in the 
hope that they could increase corporate efficiency.
17  But managers at institutional 
investors  might  dislike  that  burden.  While  they  don’t  directly  value  managerial 
autonomy in their portfolio companies, they know that there’s some spillover:  if laws 
tightened  the  slack  in  operating  firms,  that  would  induce  some  tightening  in  the 
institutional investors’ firms. And even if their engagement initially produced more 
profit, that profit would in time be competed away, to the benefit of the economy as a 
whole,  not  shareholders.  Hence,  although  the  investors  don’t  seek  to  maximize 
productivity,  they  want  profits  more  than  do  managers.    Their  ideal  point  is  at  I, 
between P and M on both axes, a bit closer to P than to M. 
Figures 1 and 2 are related.  Straighten out the right-hand side of the parabola in 
Figure 2:  it yields Figure 1.  Point I then matches up on both graphs.  So, if managers 
have the upper hand in Delaware, as we initially assume here, they might seek and get 
a result that corresponds to points M in Figures 1 and 2.  If the only players were those 
in Figure 1, that would end the game.   
 More concretely:  Posit that the rule under consideration is a hostile takeover 
rule.  The  rulemaker  chooses  among  many  permutations,  each  of  which  yields  the 
varying combinations of corporate productivity and managerial autonomy along and 
inside the parabola. On the left side of Figure 1 managers have low autonomy and 
aren’t productive, because shareholders second-guessing them too often.  On the right 
side they would have high autonomy and equally modest productivity because they 
would face no takeover threat.  At the apogee of the curve, the policymakers would 
have chosen the moderate autonomy that maximizes corporate productivity.  The rule 
could yield results inside the parabola; only y’s maximum value depends on xbut it’s 
technologically impossible to move outside the parabola.  But policymakers might be 
moderate on autonomy yet fail to get maximum productivity. 
 
 
                
Figure 3.  The Ease of a Federal Counter-Coalition if Delaware is Immoderate 
                                                            
17  See  MICHAEL  E.  PORTER,  CAPITAL  CHOICE:  CHANGING  THE  WAY  AMERICAN  INVESTS  IN 
INDUSTRY (1993) (a report to the congressional competitiveness council, recommending changing the rules 
covering how investors and managers interact). DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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Consider next the potential federal reaction in Figure 3 to the result in Figure 1.  
In Figure 3, managers get maximum autonomy via a Delaware rule, D, at M.  We draw 
bold arcs, one along the productivity/autonomy curve, running from M=D up the curve 
through I to an equal length on the upper side of I.  Investors want to move policy from 
D up along the bold portion of the trade-off parabola.  Point I would be ideal, but 
anything along the curve would be better than M=D.  And some points inside the 
parabola would be better than M=D, represented by the shaded region as we move 
south-east from I. (How an institutional investor’s preference for profits and managers’ 
preference  for  disengagement  maps  onto  the  x-y  plane  is  uncertain;  the  curve  is 
arbitrary.)  If the status quo is M=D, then there’s a large policy spaceeverything 
along the bold line and much that’s near itthat would make I better off.   
Federal policymakers would prefer almost all of that space to the Delaware rule 
down at the bottom of the productivity axis.  Notice that P is just inside the end of the 
investors’ indifference area.  So policymakers could promulgate their ideal result and 
have  investors  support.    Or,  investors  could  start  campaigning  for  their  own  ideal 
point,  knowing  that  if  policymakers  just  promulgated  their  own  ideal 
preferencePinvestors would still be better off than under the M=D status quo.   
An M=D result in Delaware is unstable. 
3.  In  the  federal  shadow:  why  don’t  managers  fully  dominate  Delaware?  
Managers anticipate that counter-coalition in Figure 3 (or Delaware authorities fear 
being federalized), so they move up the trade-off parabola from M=D in order to deter 
federal action, as in Figure 4.  Draw a new indifference arc around I, starting from the 
new D. The new arc in Figure 4 is closer to I than in Figure 3 and doesn’t include point 
P.  With investors now preferring D to P, policymakers and investors might not be able 
to cut a deal to change the status quo from D; the gains to each from their doing so are 
less in Figure 4 than in Figure 3; and investors see that instigating the policymakers is 
risky,  because  if  policymakers  promulgated  their  own  preferred  policy  resultor 
anything in the P to x regionfederal action would make investors worse off.  P is 
farther from I than is D. Hence, investors might not call for federal action and just 
acquiesce  in  the  new  D.    Or,  perhaps  more  realistically,  policymakers  are  less 
motivated to act and, if they act, find investors largely indifferent to their initiative.
18 
So, why doesn’t Delaware just let the winner take all as in Figure 1?  Managers 
we assume have enough power in Delaware to take all the marbles there, moving its 
law  to  the  left-hand  corner  of  Figure  1.  Shareholders  cannot  reincorporate  out  of 
Delaware  without  managers’  assent;  Delaware  already  has  50  to  60%  of  the 
incorporations.  
True, Delaware lawmakers may want to  make good policy, and rules in the 
middle might be good policy. And, yes, there’s a stream of future reincorporations that 
Delaware wants over the long run, so farsighted Delaware politicians have to keep 
                                                            
18 And consider coalition size. Posit that 50%+1 won’t do. Coalitions need 65% of Congress to roll-
over  the  veto  points  and  lethargy.    See  KEITH  KREHBIEL,  PIVOTAL  POLITICS:  A  THEORY  OF  U.S. 
LAWMAKING 84 (1998).  By moving up the curve, Delaware reduces policymakers’ and investors’ intensity 
in seeking federal action. Also, investors are not all located at I, but arrayed between M and P, and centered 
on I  Some investors toward the bottom of the curve would leave a coalition interested in federal action 
when Delaware moved up the curve (those few who were near M).   DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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those new California corporations’ shareholders happy about moving to Delaware.  For 
a California-chartered firm to reincorporate to Delaware, it needs its shareholders’ and 
not just its managers’ assent, so Delaware has a long-run reason not to be seen as anti-
shareholder. Perhaps these reasons are enough to explain why Delaware does not defer 
totally to incumbent managers.
19 
 
 
Figure 4.  Moderation in Delaware Stymies an Easy Federal Counter-Coalition 
But Figures 3 and 4 suggest another reason why Delaware moderates itself. If 
Delaware and the managers moved into the ultra-pro-manager segment in the bottom-
right  corner,  a  federal  counter-coalition  could  readily  form.  Federal  policymakers 
strongly dislike the Delaware result.  (Perhaps they are policymakers with slack who 
think  the  result  will  degrade  the  economy.    Or  perhaps  other  interests  active  in 
Congress dislike the result and push the policymakers to act.)  Investors dislike the 
result.    But  when  Delaware  moves  to  a  spot  outside  the  ultra  segment,  a  federal 
counter-coalition is harder to build.  Delaware is less likely to instigate Congress to 
act. The federal influence on Delaware pulls it away from where it would naturally 
come out on its own.  Since Delaware law firms that represent managers and investors 
are  key  in  legislating,  Delaware  players  have  the  structure  to  find  a  satisfactory 
manager-investor compromise.  
Hence, the initial result in Delaware is not that in Figure 1, but that in Figure 5.  
Figure 5 can be extracted from Figure 4.  It’s the segment of the parabola on the 
right, from point M to point I, straightened out.  With the federal power in the shadow, 
as in Figures 3 and 4, Delaware ends up at point D in Figure 5.  If we only observed 
Delaware directly, it would appear moderate, considered, and careful.  The federal 
shadow,  the  possibility  of  a  disgruntled  interest  group  appealing,  or  of  federal 
policymakers intervening, encourages that moderation. 
 
 
Figure 5:  The Delaware Deal in the Federal Shadow 
                                                            
19 ROMANO, supra note 2; Robert Daines, Does Delaware Incorporation Improve Firm Value?  62 
J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001) (Delaware law enhances shareholder value by as much as 5%). DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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Delaware’s moderate takeover law exemplifies how the federal threat tempers 
its lawmaking. Delaware passed its takeover law in the late 1980s, after most other 
states had enacted tough antitakeover statutes.  Delaware legislators asked why they 
shouldn’t entirely shut down hostile takeovers for Delaware targets. Managers seemed 
to have a winning hand in Delaware, yet Delaware passed a moderate law. Consider 
how the law’s primary drafter reacted when confronted with that question: 
[W]hy … moderate …? Why [not] the most restrictive thing that we can 
pass?  … [If] our legislation is viewed either in the short run or the long 
run as unbalanced and unreasonable, we all know that ultimately … we 
might have to pay the price … of the federal government coming in and 
taking … that privilege from us.
20 
Even  when  managers  had  the  votes  in  Delaware,  shareholders  had  clout  in 
Reagan-era  Washington;  and,  shareholders  if  defeated  in  Delaware  on  an  issue  of 
national importance, might have appealed to Washington, where the play of interests 
differed  and  the  outcome  was  uncertain.  At  the  time,  powerful  policymakers  in 
Washington  favored  takeovers.  Perhaps  the  shareholders  and  takeover  moderates 
would have lost on the federal levelthere’s reason to think that by the end of the 
1980s the federal array wasn’t as proshareholder as it was earlier in that decadebut 
the antitakeover forces didn’t want to take that chance. 
This kind of Delaware-federal interplay has arisen before, and since:  When the 
SEC disliked state rules on going-private transactions, it announced new rules of its 
own, took to the bully pulpit, and induced Delaware to change.
21  When it disliked 
Delaware’s validation of a targeted buyback in a takeover, the SEC propounded its all-
holder’s rule that reversed the Delaware result.
22  When Congress considered massive 
corporate  legislation  in  the  wake  of  the  Enron  and  WorldCom  scandals,  which  it 
eventually  enacted,  Delaware’s  Chief  Justice  announced:    “[if]  we  don’t  fix  it, 
Congress will….”
23  These are some examples; there are more.
24 
4. How Delaware diminishes the congressional deal space.  More is going on 
than  just  Delaware  moderating  itself  in  the  shadow  of  potential  federal  action.  
Consider  next  when  Congress  displaces  some  Delaware  deals  and  why.  Return  to 
                                                            
20 Hearing on H.B. 396 Before the Delaware H.R., 134
th Gen. Assembly (Jan. 26, 1988) (testimony 
of A. Gilchrist Sparks III, chairman of the Delaware Bar Ass’n Corp. Law Council), audiotape, as reported 
in Kahan & Kamar, supra note 5, at 741 n.230 (2002) (emphasis added). 
21  RONALD  J.  GILSON  &  BERNARD  S.  BLACK,  THE  LAW  AND  FINANCE  OF  CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS 1256 & n.40 (2d ed. 1995); Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 3, at 616-21, and 
sources cited in both. 
22 Proposed Amendment to SEC Tender Offer Rules, 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1320, 1321 & n.5 
(1985). 
23 Charles Elson, What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation? HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 2003, at 68, 
77 (comments of E. Norman Veasey, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware).  Whether the Chief 
Justice’s “we” refers to Delaware or to the corporate world is unclearhe was speaking at a roundtable, not 
writing in a carefully considered judicial opinion.  But either way, he is speaking consistently with the thesis 
here:    either  the  corporate  players  or  Delaware,  or  the  first  with  the  second’s  help,  had  better  fix  up 
corporate governance or Congress will act. 
24 See Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 3, at 607-34. DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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Figure 4, which illustrates a manager-investor compromise instead of a winner-take-all 
result. As John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan have said in a parallel context: 
When  congress  delegates  authority  to  an  [administrative]  agency,  it 
permits the agency to make the first move:  to establish a policy … [that], 
if it is not preempted by legislation… , will be the policy that prevails.  … 
…  [T]he key to analyzing [this] type of policy-making is … [to examine 
its] sequential structure.   
…  Given the sequential structure of decision-making, the agency will 
often be able to take an action that would not command a majority in the 
legislature,  but  …  Congress  …  will  [nevertheless  not]  do  anything  to 
affect the course of action.
25 
Begin with the Delaware compromise in Figure 4 and examine the space above 
the  investors’  indifference  arc  near P,  marked  by  x.    The  x-P  region  is no  longer 
attainable in Congress. Why? If the two big players reach a deal in Delaware, they do 
not want to move to any point further from their indifference limits. The two can unite 
to  defeat  points  like  x  in  Figure  6.   The  region close  to P  is  out of  bounds  after 
Delaware acts. It’s as if Delaware gave managers and investors the means to quickly 
caucus and set a status quo. 
  
 
              
Figure 6.  The Constricted Deal Space in Congress After Delaware Acts 
If policy x, or indeed P, reached the national agenda after Delaware had acted, 
one  would  hear  that  it  was  beyond  the  SEC’s  authority,  that  it  would  upset  the 
traditional  federal-state  divide,  that  it  would  violate  internal  affairs  norms,  that 
corporate law should be left to the states.  Yet had x or P come up before Delaware 
                                                            
25 John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
SPECIAL ISSUE 1, 2 (1990).   
26  KREHBIEL,  supra  note  18,  at  4-48;  McNollgast,  Positive  Canons:  The  Role  of  Legislative 
Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, [720-21] (1992); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of 
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1321, 1325-26, 1341-42 (2001).  “A national 
government  that  can  act  only  with  difficulty,  after  all,  will  tend  to  leave  considerable  scope  for  state 
autonomy.”    Ernest  Young,  Making  Federalism  Doctrine:    Fidelity,  Institutional  Competence,  and  the 
Movement of History (2004) (MS at 35). DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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acted, it would have been a possible outcome in Washington. Washington’s slowness 
and its many veto gates make a real federal-state interplay possible.
27   
When managers and investors set the status quo in Delawarethe default result 
that persists if Washington does nothingwe get D.  If federal policymakers set the 
initial agenda, we’d be more likely to get corporate rules approximating x.  True, if 
investors could costlessly invoke federal policymakers against a D result, and then 
managers against a P result, policy should converge on I.  But realistically, investors 
cannot keep the policymakers bidding.  They act once or twice, and usually not at all. 
Delaware acts, and then at great cost federal policymakers might act. 
 *   *   * 
We now have two institutional results. First, Delaware, fearing federal action, 
won’t be extreme. Even if  corner results could pass in an isolated Delaware, they 
won’t in a Delaware with its eye on Congress.  The looming federal threat puts about 
half of the Delaware line in Figure 1that portion which would most offend managers 
or investorsoff limits. Second, once Delaware acts, a large fraction of what would 
previously have been reachable in Congresswhere national interests and ideologies 
are importantis put off-limits, because both Delaware incumbents prefer the status 
quo to federal action. 
5. Congress: Wide interests, broad ideas.  Figures 2, 3, 4, and 6 portray the 
federal policymakers favorably:  They seek the public good and they are competent.  
But many observers don’t think so favorably of them when they make corporate law.
28 
Analogous results, however, arise even when federal policymakers make bad law, and 
especially when they make law that favors noncorporate interest groups. 
So we now add other interests and ideologies, such as those of populists who 
want to level down power inside the corporation and give more incumbent employees.  
We add the new interests below the perfect productivity-oriented policymakers’ point 
P at the top of the curve in Figure 7, at Po.  The populists don’t intrinsically dislike 
corporate productivity, but they are maximizing in other dimensions (raising wages, 
improving  environmental  quality,  flattening  corporate  hierarchies,  increasing 
affirmative action).  These policies, even if they maximize social wealth, often take 
something away from investors and managers.  Investors and managers, if Po policies 
trump the initial, default rule that Delaware makes, have to cut a piece of the corporate 
pie for others.  
  
 
 
 
                                                            
27  KREHBIEL,  supra  note  18,  at  4-48;  McNollgast,  Positive  Canons:  The  Role  of  Legislative 
Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, [720-21] (1992); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of 
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEXAS L. REV. 1321, 1325-26, 1341-42 (2001).  “A national 
government  that  can  act  only  with  difficulty,  after  all,  will  tend  to  leave  considerable  scope  for  state 
autonomy.”    Ernest  Young,  Making  Federalism  Doctrine:    Fidelity,  Institutional  Competence,  and  the 
Movement of History (2004) (MS at 35). 
28 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 2; Winter, supra note 2, at 1529 (“we need . . . not a federal 
chartering statute but rather a second Delaware”). DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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Figure 7.  When Federal Policymakers Demean Efficiency 
Posit also that state law race mechanisms push policy closer to the optimal rules 
for the corporate players.  States race to the top, or at least Delaware does.  Align 
managers with investors sufficiently closely so that I=M=Di, which is well above Po. 
Delaware is thus more efficient and productive here than would be the federal populist 
policymakers’ preference. We could also posit that some investors, at Io are inside the 
productivity vs. autonomy frontier, either because they are misguided, because they are 
headline-seekers without productivity in mind, or because they are captured by other 
interests who seek to divert corporate value from shareholders and managers. Some 
say that the public pension funds and the AFL-CIO funds fit this description.
29  If 
managers get their best result in Delaware (M=Di), then Po and Io might seek federal 
action. An uneasy coalition of populists and activist investors could displace the M=Di 
result.  We would reach the same result if we instead posited that federal policymakers 
were more often than not mistaken, thereby demeaning productivity when they acted.  
Wrongheaded policymakers at Po could ally with Io in Congress to try to overturn an 
M=Di Delaware result in Congress.  Either way, Delaware and some of its interest 
groups thus have a reason to move inside the parabola to reduce the intensity of federal 
opposition.  They choose Do.
30 
6. The tax code and the corporations code.  An intuition behind the geometry is 
at hand. If Congress made most corporate law directly, America’s corporate law would 
look more like the tax code the current corporate law in terms of the interests in play.  
Like  the  tax  code,  corporations  and  their  governing  law  affect  the  broad  mass  of 
American citizenry, and Congress legislates public policy through whatever tools it 
has.  It uses the tax code to promote exports, to promote research, to subsidize oil and 
                                                            
29 See the discussion of the shareholder access debate infra note 52 & accompanying text. 
30 Superimposing the divided Washington from Figure 7 onto the earlier diagrams of a moderate 
Delaware can be reinterpreted in political theory’s veto terms:  As long as Delaware is moderate, polarized 
veto players in Washington either veto a major shift from D, or fear a counter-coalition (policymakers at P 
fearing populists and managers at Po, Io, and M, say) that would shift the federal result farther from their 
preferred point.  Philip Keefer & David Stasavage, The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank 
Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 407 (2003). DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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gas exploration, to promote economic development in depressed areas, to better the 
environment, to subsidize medical care.
31  A national corporate code would be one 
more tool.  
We need not go far back to find a concrete example:  In the 2004 election, one 
candidate, “[r]esponding to widespread anxiety about the movement of American jobs 
overseas,” asserted that the tax code should be used to discourage outsourcing.
 32  A 
national  corporations  code  would  likely  be  a  tool  for  similar  public  goals.  Tax 
exemptions, deductions, credits, and rates are a fundamental part of American social 
policy.    If  corporate  law  were  made  in  Congress,  it  would  similarly  reflect  more 
general public policy concerns, and broader interest group politics, than it now does. 
7. Shareholders’ and managers’ joint interest in minimizing federal influence. 
Another public choice perspective can be seen here. I began this Part with managers 
and  most  investors  allied,  then  analyzed  how  Delaware  might  react  when  they 
disagreed.  Posit that they know that in Delaware the two of them split up the corporate 
pie.  Although I have analyzed here the federal-state interaction primarily when their 
goals  differ,  much  of  the  time  their  interests  are  the  same,  and  managers  and 
shareholders are more likely to get their preferred results in Delaware’s simple interest 
group environment than in  Congress’s complex one.  True, when they differ on  a 
particular  issue,  shareholders  might  conclude  that  they  could  do  better  vis-à-vis 
managers by going federal. But they might not try to make a federal case even then, 
because the price of beating managers at the federal level could be leakage to other 
groups absent from Delaware, in a way that would make shareholders’ net benefit zero, 
or even  negative. 
Figure  8  illustrates.  The  federal  players  are  two:  productivity-oriented, 
competent  policymakers  at  the  top  of  the  parabola,  and  populists  deep  inside  the 
parabola.  The policymakers at P care only about productivity (think about them as 
representing  consumers’  interests,  if  one  has  trouble  thinking  of  public-minded 
policymakers), so their indifference curve is a horizontal line going through D.  They 
prefer the entire space above that line.  The populists have a simple agenda herethey 
simply  wish  to  reduce  corporate  power,  preferring  less  managerial  autonomy 
                                                            
31  Stanley  S.  Surrey,  Tax  Incentives  as  a  Device  for  Implementing  Government  Policy:  A 
Comparison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 709-12 (1970); STANLEY S. 
SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COMM. ON THE 
BUDGET, TAX EXPENDITURES COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS, 
105
th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998).  Tax expenditures from the corporate tax are about $100 billion per year.  Id. 
at 7.  Since the Treasury gets about between $150 and $200 billion each year from the corporate tax, U.S. 
TREASURY, THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004, tbl. 2.1, at 29-30 (2004), the expenditure amounts to 
almost one-third of the potential total. 
32  Edmund  L.  Andrews  &  Jodi  Wilgoren,  Kerry  to  Propose  Eliminating  a  Tax  Break on  U.S. 
Companies’  Overseas  Profits,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Mar.  26,  2004,  at  12;  Deborah  McGregor,  Kerry  pledges 
corporate  tax  policy  reform,  FIN.  TIMES,  Mar.  26,  2004,  at  __  (“Mr.  Kerry  presented  his  plan  …  in 
Michigan,  a  politically  important  state  where  6.6  per  cent  of  workers  are  unemployed  and  many 
manufacturing jobs have moved abroad.”). 
33 This could be analogized to a standard prisoners’ dilemma game, with the prisoners able to 
coordinate and thus not defect.  For how iterated prisoners’ dilemma games can lead to cooperation, see 
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 40-42, 53-54, 118-20 (1984).  The status quo as 
impeding later change could also be illustrated with game theory’s theory of the core. DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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regardless of the effect on productivity..  Their indifference curve is a vertical line 
running through D.   
 
            
 
Figure 8.  When Entering the Federal Arena Hurts Managers and Shareholders 
In  this  scenario,  there  is  a  possible  policymaker-populist  alliance,  one  that 
simultaneously  increases  corporate  productivity  and  managerial  autonomy.  It  runs 
approximately along the line between x and y. The primary corporate players oppose 
entering most of that space. If they fear that federal action would systematically push 
corporate policy deep enough into that space, investors and managers have reason to 
systematically oppose increasing the federal presence in corporate lawmaking.   
And when managers’ and investors’ positions are the same, when M=D=Ior 
closeno federal action is normally possible.  These two powerful interest groups 
cannot do better in Washington, so they resist moving the game to Washington. Only 
when  overwhelming  forcea  major  scandal  or  economic  reversalseriously 
empowers either the policymakers or the populists, or both, do the federal authorities 
act. 
What’s important conceptually about the geometry here is that the deal space in 
Congress  is  wider  than  that  in  Delaware.  It  encompasses  all  of  the  Delaware 
possibilities,  and  by  adding  new  groups  and  ideas,  the  area  of  possible  outcomes 
expands  in  ways  that  hurt  managers  and  investors.  The  wider  possibilities  in 
Congresseither demeaning productivity or improving it in the name of fairness (or 
mistake),  but  hurting  managers  or  investors  or  bothpress  the  primary  Delaware 
players to keep Congress quiet. 
*  *  * 
The overall situation militates toward the two primary groups being reluctant to 
invoke federal authorities.  Shareholders may on a particular issue conclude that they 
could do better enough in Congress to pay for the leakage to third parties who are 
weak in Delaware but strong in Congress. But they still might not go federal, fearing 
that if more corporate law were federal, more of the corporate pie would go to third 
parties on other issues.
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Consider this report of federal activity in an era less conservative than our own:  
“A national coalition of union, consumer, liberal and leftist groups is emerging with 
the  purpose  of  starting  a  broad,  aggressive  attack  on  what  the  activists  regard  as 
flagrant abuses of corporate power. The activists list several goals, including … citizen 
participation  in  corporate  decision  making.”
34    And,  more  recently,  William 
McDonough, chairman of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, told “a 
packed Washington ballroom … at the National Association of Corporate Directors’ 
2003 Annual Corporate Governance Conference” that 
The way democracies work, if the people say they want something, they’ll get it.  
Nobody would have predicted Sarbanes-Oxley would have passed six months 
before it passed… . The American people are sufficiently angry that if the private 
sector doesn’t get its act together … they’re going to get Sarbanes-Oxley No. 2, 
No. 3, No. 4, and it will curl your hair. I have been asked by many members of 
Congress  if  I  could  figure  out  a  way  that  they  could  pass  a  law  controlling 
compensation.
35 
Free  rider  effects  might  induce  any  individual  Delaware  player—an  investor 
here, a manager there—to go federal on an issue especially salient to that player.  But 
interest  group  associations  temper  individual  action:  the  Business  Roundtable  for 
managers, the Council of Institutional Investors for one large class of stockholders, the 
Investment Company Institute for another. These associations can overcome free rider 
calculations of immediate interest. For shareholders or managers to go federal and be 
effective, at least one lobbying organization must swing into action. And even when 
one does go federal, it has reason to avoid institutionalizing easy federal action.  It 
wants to win on the specific issue at hand, but it prefers not to institutionalize federal 
activity, which would make it easier for other interest groups to influence corporate 
law.
36 
8. Delaware’s interest in minimizing federal influence.  Delaware though, as 
distinct from its primary interest groups, might not care that Congress federalized some 
corporate law.  After all, if Congress federalizes a law, Delaware need not lose tax 
revenues; no one would flee Delaware because it lost an issue to Washington, because 
no other state could do better for managers and investors. Delaware loses corporate 
law, but not charters or taxes. And on some hot issues, Delaware’s state apparatus 
might even prefer federalization, which would level the state-to-state playing field by 
reducing other states’ opportunities on the contested issue, thereby letting Delaware 
compete and win where it’s stronger.
37   
                                                            
34 William Serrin, Coalition Forming for a 1980‘s Drive Against Business, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 
1980, at 19 (emphases added).  [See Zachary Gubler, Corporate Governance Seminar Paper Outline (Jan. 
15, 2005)]. 
35  Michael  P.  Bruno,  Exec  Comp  to  Haunt  Directors  in  2004,  INSTITUTIONAL  SHAREHOLDER 
SERVICES, THE FRIDAY REPORT (Oct. 24, 2003), available at www.iss.proxy.com. 
36 This could be analogized to a standard prisoners’ dilemma game, with the prisoners able to 
coordinate and thus not defect.  For how iterated prisoners’ dilemma games can lead to cooperation, see 
ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 40-42, 53-54, 118-20 (1984).  The status quo as 
impeding later change could also be illustrated with game theory’s theory of the core. 
37 Roe, supra note 3, at 637.   DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
 
23
But Delaware would be unwise to let a lot move to Washington.  Letting it go 
would  annoy  its  primary  interest  groups,  who  might  want  Delaware  to  protect 
managers and investors from federal action. Its reputation for good lawmaking would 
be hurt if federal authorities regularly displaced it. If the public or corporate America 
lost  confidence  in  Delaware,  the  franchise  tax  would  be  threatened.  If  Delaware 
authorities lost their esprit, their lawmaking quality would suffer.  If too much went 
federal,  the  bar  and  corporate  America  could  conclude  that  Delaware  had  lost  its 
relevance. If this occurred, fewer firms would want to go to Delaware, and Delaware’s 
network  externalities  would  weaken  because  it  did  less,  thereby  opening  up 
competitive  opportunities  for  other  states.  At  the  limit,  if  Washington  made  all 
corporate law, but states still chartered firms, then Delaware couldn’t charge more 
because its charter wouldn’t come with any local law.  Delaware’s tax bonanza would 
shrivel.  
Moreover,  Delaware's  primary  interest  groupsmanagers  and  investors 
usually  do  not  want  corporate  law  to  go  federal.   Nor  do  its  secondary  interest 
groupsits  corporate  bar  and  its  corporate  industry.    National  law  is  litigated 
elsewhere; when Congress or the SEC makes the rules, the Delaware bar watches as 
corporate litigation moves to federal courts.
38 Delaware’s interest groups can influence 
Delaware’s politics even without threatening to remove the franchise tax. 
9.  Efficiency?  Efficiency-oriented  analysts  who  think  federal  action  would 
usually  push  corporate  policy  to  better,  more  cost-effective  corporate  governance, 
more competition, more rewards to innovation, prefer more federal action.
39  Others 
fear  well  intentioned  but  inefficient  federal  policymakersor  fear  interest  group 
gridlock that would cramp corporate agility and prove costly to the economy.  Still 
others would prefer corporations to have a wider conception of the public goodand 
more interest group inputthan Delaware gives them. Views on whether more federal 
action is wise may depend not only on which outcome the speaker prefers, but also on 
which federal outcome the speaker anticipates. 
Could the multi-level federal structure improve on single-level governance?  If 
the state-level is defective, a federal overlay can ameliorate that drop to the bottom.  
But if the federal level is defective, the de facto delegation may narrow the interest 
group input and cabin federal corporate lawmaking. By separating a proposal from 
ratification,  the  bifurcated  structure  could  reduce  the  defects  of  each.
40  Congress 
                                                            
38 Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:  Reflections 
Upon  Federalism,  56  VAND.  L.  REV.  859  (2003);  Robert  B.  Thompson,  Corporate  Governance  After 
Enron, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 99 (2003). 
39 See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. 
CORP. L. 625, 636-37 (2004); cf. Pierre Salmon, Vertical competition in a unitary state, in COMPETITION 
AND STRUCTURE:  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLLECTIVE DECISIONS:  ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALBERT 
BRETON  239,  253  (Gianluigi  Galeotti,  Pierre  Salmon  &  Ronald  Wintrobe,  eds. 2000).  Cf. also  Lucian 
Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice, 87 VA. L. REV. 993 (2001). 
40 Cf. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 301, 303–04, 308 (1983).  See generally DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING 
POWERS:  A TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 
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cannot decide everything; Delaware, with money to protect, has reason to avoid losing 
that money.   
Such  theories  are  hard  to  test.  The  two-tiered  structure  might  not  propel 
Delaware to do better.  True, if federal actors are usually good lawmakers when they 
are attentive, then their looming power ought to induce Delaware to be better.  But if 
they’re usually worse, Delaware would head them off with bad law, not good law.  
And, if it’s the random scandal that induces federal action, then Delaware has reason to 
market  that  it  can  control  scandalous  corporate  matters.  Public  relations,  not  good 
lawmaking, would become the issue. Conceivably the recent well-publicized trial on 
Michael Orvitz’s $125 million paycheck from Disney is a Delaware show trial, one 
that shows that it’s getting the corporate scandalsEnron, WorldCom, and executive 
payunder control.   
 
B. Examples 
 
Thus far we’ve generated two major results from the abstractions of federal-state 
relations  in  making  American  corporate  law.    Delaware  has  reason  to  temper  its 
dominant interest group due to the federal overlay.  When Delaware’s interest groups 
are unified such that it can act first, they can set the status quo and sometimes deflect 
federal action.  Its interest groups jointly do better in Delaware than in a federal forum. 
Here we look for concrete examples that fit these two federal-state public choice 
interactions. We’ve seen one already:  the wide array of interests and ideas that work 
their  way  into  the  tax  code,  as  would  be  common  if  corporate  law  were  made  in 
Congress.
41  There are others:  antitrust, foreign corrupt practices, takeovers, state-law 
constituency statutes, and the incentives and actions of big-state public pension funds 
each point out how moving a corporate issue from Delaware to the federal arena would 
change the players and pressures.  Some moved, some did not.  And whether they did 
or did not move affected who won and who lost. 
1. Federal displacement:  actual and potential – (a) Antitrust. During the late 
19
th and early 20
th century corporate law and antitrust issues intertwined, and states 
decided both.  Several industries sought to stabilize shaky cartels with trusts, in which 
a centralized trustee held the stock of constituent companies and coordinated their 
production quotas. The trust form arose at the end of the 19
th century because states 
barred their corporations from owning stock of other states’ companies.  This trend 
reversed in 1889 when New Jersey, and then later Delaware, passed corporate law that 
helped integrate disparate producers into a single company. This led the antitrust forces 
to call for a federal incorporation law and for federal antitrust enforcement.
42 
The key state players were insiders and investors. Both wanted corporate law to 
facilitate monopolization and cartelization. They initially got favorable organizational 
law, via the trusts. But the trusts were clumsy, and some states—states like Ohio with 
players  beyond  managers  and  investors,  progressive  players  who  preferred  public-
                                                            
41 See supra p. 19. 
42 See generally James B. Dill, National Incorporation Laws for Trusts, 11 YALE L.J. 273 (1902); 
[Lincoln Steffens, New Jersey: A Traitor State, Part I, MCCLURE’S, May 1905, at 46–47.] DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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regarding policies—attacked them.
43 The smaller states, though, like New Jersey and 
Delaware,  streamlined  their  holding  company  rules,  thereby  allowing  holding 
companies to overcome the trusts’ organizational weaknesses.  Owners and insiders 
got  what  they  wanted.  On  the  small-state  level,  the  progressives,  public  interest 
advocates, and anti-big-business players (T.R., Sherman, and Brandeis) were weaker 
than they were in bigger states and in Washington. 
In Washington, the progressive forces were eventually strong enough to upset 
the first (pro-trust) coalition with antitrust law and enforcement. In time, the antitrust 
forces won, and they won at the federal level.  
The pro-trust forces prevailed for a time at the state level, because public interest 
players and the average American voter were underrepresented in key small states. The 
pro-trust forces thus got their monopolizing corporate law mechanisms, and it took a 
decade or two for federal authorities to catch up with them. During that time, players 
who could dominate a small state but not Congress reaped monopoly profits. The 1901 
U.S. Steel merger built a monopoly that eroded by 1920, but J.P. Morgan and his 
syndicate made much money in the interim. The Standard Oil monopoly formed via a 
trust  in  the  1880s,  benefited  from  New  Jersey’s  corporate  law  in  the  1890s,  and 
persisted until destroyed at the federal level in 1911. Agenda sequencing counted. If 
federal authorities had acted first, and had later decided whether to defer to states, then 
the  monopolies  would  not  have  won  initially.  The  end  result  was  not  monopoly 
forever, but monopoly for two decades, which is plenty. 
(b)  Foreign  corrupt  practices.  Corporate  players  had  little  reason  to  reduce 
American corporate bribery of foreign government officials. Bribery could backfire, 
but so could other investment or business decisions. In the narrow sense, managers and 
investors could see the corporate decision to bribe a foreign official to sell warplanes, 
to build a dam, or to get a tax concession as just another business decision. 
But  that  bribery  could  undermine  American  foreign  policy,  so  national 
policymakers might want to stop it for moral or foreign policy reasons. Moving the 
play from Delaware changed the range of players with power to decide and, via the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, preempted the state law result.
44 
*   *   * 
Though the antitrust and corrupt practices examples have a negative connotation 
to state insulation, in other settings Delaware’s first-mover advantage in setting a status 
quo could make for a corporate law could be different. Depending on one’s views of 
the policy matters, some of the following examples might be positive ones. 
(c)  Takeovers?  When  hostile  takeovers  were  important,  managers—via  the 
Business Roundtable and National Association of Manufacturers—opposed moving 
the  decisionmaking  to  Washington,  even  though  Delaware  at  the  time  was  not 
producing  strong  antitakeover  rulings  and  statutes  they  wanted.
45  Raiders  favored 
preemption, but shareholders generally were silent.  And in Delaware, managersor at 
                                                            
43 State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Standard Oil Co., 30 N.E. 279 (Ohio 1892). 
44 Pub. L. No. 95-213 1494 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
45 Witnesses at Takeover Bill Hearing Split on Preemption of State Regulation, 19 SEC. REG. & L. 
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least their lawyersargued that Delaware should make moderate takeover law because 
something strong would risk federal intervention.
46   
(d) Sarbanes-Oxley. The statute overall illustrates a Congress swept by scandal 
and national opinion into regulating corporate organization in a way it usually leaves to 
state  law.  Delaware  authorities  did  seek  the  chance  to  remedy  the  corporate 
governance  debilities  that  the  scandals  highlighted,
47  but  the  state  didn’t  act 
dramatically, perhaps because the concerned officials were judges, who need a case to 
act, or because Delaware’s primary interest groups wouldn’t have been able to agree 
easily on what to do.
48 
Two secondary aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley exemplify the interest group density 
in the federal forum:  It bars executives and directors from trading their companies’ 
stock during blackout periods when their companies’ employees could not trade,
49 and 
it also requires executives whose companies later go bankrupt to return any profits 
made from bailing out of their companies’ stock.
50 
Few managers, and probably not too many investors, were interested in either 
provision. Supporters in Washington, however, included players without much muscle 
in Delaware lawmaking, such as Local 125 of the Internal Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers [and the Pension Rights Center, the Employee Benefit Research Institute, the 
American Association of Retired People, the Consumers Union, and the Consumer 
Federation of America].
51  
(e)  Shareholder  access.  The  SEC  proposed  recently  that  shareholders  have 
direct access to public companies’ proxy statements to nominate directors, thereby 
evoking both ends of the federal spectrum with productivity and, possibly, populist 
                                                            
46 Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 885, 908 (1990) (describing the merger bar’s concerns that “passing this [antitakeover] proposal 
would be the proverbial camel-back-breaking straw that would force Congress to enact national corporate 
chartering”). The well-known  merger lawyer Joseph Flom lobbyied against an anti-takeover law partly 
because it could provoke federal preemption. Martin Lipton, the well-known anti-takeover lawyer, also 
lobbied against that same anti-takeover law.  Id. at 906.  
47 E.  Norman  Veasey,  The  Role  of  the  Delaware  Courts  in  United  States  Business  Litigation, 
Address  Before  ALI-ABA  Advanced  Course  of  Study  on  United  States  Domestic  and  International 
Litigation and Dispute Resolution 1, 3 (Apr. 11, 2002) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  See 
also  E.  Norman  Veasey,  Musings  on  the  Dynamics  of  Corporate  Governance  Issues,  Director 
Liability Concerns, Corporate Control Transactions, Ethics and Federalism, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
1007, 1017-18 (2003) (Sarbanes-Oxley should not induce state  lawmakers to despair but “should 
inspire states to be a part of the solution”). 
48 See Strine, supra note 6, at 1268-70 (quoted supra on p. 7). 
49 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 306, 116 Stat. 779 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7244 (2003).  The bar applies to stock the executive acquired in connection with employment at the 
company. 
50 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §§ 304, 306. 
51 Senate Comm. On Governmental Affairs, 107
th Cong., Retirement Insecurity:  401(k) Crisis at 
Enron 9-11 (2002); Sen. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, Protecting the Pensions of 
Working Americans:  Lessons from the Enron Debacle (Feb. 7, 2002) (2002-S431-23); House Comm. On 
Education and the Workforce:  Enron and Beyond:  Legislative Solutions (Feb. 27, 2002) (CIS-NO: 2003-
H341-13);  Sen.  Legislative  History  of  Title  VIII  of  HR  2673:  The  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002  (July 
26,2002) (148 Cong Rec S 7418). DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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considerations. The SEC sought greater managerial accountability, to make American 
companies better run.  Said its SEC champion:  the commission’s goal here should be 
to  better  control  “a  small  minority  of  lazy,  inefficient,  grossly  overpaid  and 
wrongheaded C.E.O’s.”
52  Here is the productivity motivation for federal action. 
Managers opposed the SEC.  They said that greater shareholder access would 
play into the hands not of shareholders, but of groups that wanted to influence the 
corporation. The Business Roundtablemanagers’ principal lobbying organization 
charged that access would empower state and labor union pension funds to advance 
their  collateral  agenda,  one  not  tied  tightly  to  corporate  profitability.
53  For  similar 
reasons  CalPERS’  support  as  stockholder  for  labor  unions  in  the  Safeway 
strikediscussed  nextwas  cast  as  a  harbinger  of  what  would  happen  if  such 
shareholders had direct access to corporate America’s proxy statements.
54 Here was 
the populist, new interest group motivation or result perceived to be part of federal 
action, just as it was part of big state investments. 
2.  Analogous  larger  jurisdictions.  --  The  basic  thesis  here  is  an  analogy:  
Delaware is like an independent agency in several respects, although much farther 
from  the  congressional  orbit.    With  the  analogy  in  mind,  we  can  better  our 
understanding of American corporate lawmaking.  Such an analogy doesn’t directly 
yield disprovable statements: Differences between agencies and Delaware just weaken 
the analogy.  But no one would say Delaware is just like an agency, so differences 
don’t disprove the analogy. 
But the analogy yields implications that are themselves testable and refutable.  
While Delaware can’t go so far from congressional preferences that it goads them to 
act, we’d expect it to use its slack for its own and its dominant interest groups benefit.  
So, we’d expect that its rules would differ from those made in larger jurisdictions with 
more heterogeneous interest group inputs.  In theory this yields refutable implications 
if  we  turned  Delaware off  for  two  decades  while  Congress  made  corporate  law 
directly or through a normal agency, we’d expect a differing tilt. 
That test can’t be run before this Article is published.  But we can look to other 
polities  larger  than  Delaware  and  see  if  when  make  corporate  or  similar  law  they 
resemble Delaware or evince greater interest group inputs. 
(a). CalPERS.  State public pension funds, an institutional close cousin to state 
corporate law, are subject to the wider pressures I say would be in play if Congress 
were more active in making American corporate law 
California  is  a  big  state;  its  huge  public  pension  planone  of  the  biggest 
stockholders in Americafaces the mix of interests that would emerge if American 
corporate law were made primarily on the national stage instead of in little Delaware.  
                                                            
52 Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Members Says Agency Has Bowed to Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 
2004, at C1.  The quotation is of Harvey Goldschmid, an SEC Commissioner.  The words could also be 
turned into a populist statement too. 
53 John J. Castellani & Amy Goodman, The Case Against the SEC Director Election Proposal, in 
SHAREHOLDER ACCESS TO THE CORPORATE BALLOT __ (Lucian Bebchuk ed. 2004) (forthcoming) (MS at 
9-10, 18-19).  John Castellani is the president of the Business Roundatable. 
54 Joann S. Lublin & Jonathan Weil, Gadfly Activism at CalPERS Leads to Possible Ouster of 
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Consider CalPERS’ “double bottom line.” When running its stock portfolio, it looks 
first at the return to shareholders. But it also looks, says its president, to “producing 
some other good for the citizens of California.”
55 New York’s Governor appointed a 
task force during the takeover-era that endorsed similar policies.
56 Roberta Romano 
has shown that politically-motivated investment policies fall short of the market rate of 
return.
57  Said a recent conservative chair of the SEC, after his tenure was over, state 
pension fund influence on the American corporation is to be avoided:  “I think we will 
all be better off if we were spared the extension of our flawed political system to our 
corporate  boardrooms[.]
58  Meanwhile,  Washington  players  have  “advocated  using 
public pension funds to finance infrastructure projects… .”
59 
Consider  this  excerpt  from  a  recent  CalPERS  letter  to  one  of  its  portfolio 
companies, Safeway, regarding a labor there that had become a public controversy. 
The  letter  uses  the  language  of  shareholder  value,  but  one  wonders  whether 
shareholder value or public policy was primary:   
CalPERS  currently  owns  $77,181,120  worth  of  equity  shares  in  your 
company. … As a long term investor we believe that fair treatment of 
employees  [including  providing  a  reasonable  health  plan]  is  a  critical 
element  in  creating  long  term  value  for  shareholders.  …    [Y]our 
corporation’s blatant disregard for quality of life issues … is having a 
significant impact on our investment in your corporation.  [W]e urge you 
in the strongest terms possible, to negotiate in good faith with the UFCW 
[the  United  Food  and  Commercial  Workers  union]  and  to  provide  a 
benefit package that enhances the productivity of your employees as well 
as the long term value for shareowners.
60   
CalPERS then sought to block reelection of Safeway’s President and CEO to the 
Safeway board.  The press, or at least the conservative press, thought that CalPERS 
was not acting in its beneficiaries’ interest as stockholders, but was motivated by a 
desire  to  change  Safeway’s  labor  policy.
61  But  CalPERS’  leadersselected  by 
                                                            
55  Simon  London,  The  Boardroom  Burden:Calpers  chief  relaxes  in  the  eye  of  the  storm,  FIN. 
TIMES, June 2, 2004, at 12.  
56 GOVERNOR [CUOMO]’S TASK FORCE ON PENSION FUND INVESTMENT, OUR MONEY’S WORTH 
45-48 (1989). 
57 Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 826-27 (1993). 
58 Adrian Michaels, Former SEC Chairman Attacks Plans to Let Investors Nominate Directors, 
FIN. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at 1. The former chair, Harvey Pitt, was commenting on an SEC proposal to 
extend shareholder authority, which he feared would further empower state pension plans.  
59 Romano, supra note 57, at 796.  
60 Cf. Letter from CalPERS to Steven A. Burd, Chairman, President & CEO Safeway Inc., dated 
Dec. 17, 2003, re United Food and Commercial Workers Labor Negotiations.  This and similar CalPERS 
letters are at www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/invest-corp/ufcw-supermarket-ltr.pdf.   
61 See also Calpers Comeuppance, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2004 (editorial) (“most shareholders … 
concluded that the real Calpers agenda [in opposing Safeway’s CEO for reelection] was political—namely 
to punish [him] for driving a hard bargain with his unionized work force.  Eleven of Calpers’s 13 board 
members have strong ties to organized labor … .”).  Cf. Deborah Brewster, Unions discover how to get a 
voice in the boardrooms, FIN. TIMES (London), May 4, 2004, at 22 (AFL-CIO finding state pension funds 
as allies, with “[t]he more activist funds tend[ing] to be … from Democratic states, such as California and 
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ordinary  pensioners  and  California  politicians
62could  be  seen  as  representing  a 
broader  constituency.  For  similar  reasons,  CalPERS  also  invests  in  California’s 
economically depressed areas and promotes environmental and other social issues in 
its portfolio firms.
63  Conservative legislators, unhappy with CalPERS’ activities now 
seek  to  allow  California’s pensioners  to  manage  their  own  pension  monies,  which 
would erode CalPERS’ power.
64 
(b) Constituency statutes. Other interests are not always on the periphery of state 
corporate law, as they are in Delaware.
65 It depends on which state, and what issue. 
Consider constituency statutes, which bring public forces into corporate governance, 
via the rhetoric of managerial discretion to consider interests beyond shareholders and 
managers.
66 True, their effect has largely been to give managers a rhetorical basis for 
opposing takeovers. State constituency statutes can thus be seen as managers going up 
from the baseline of the trapezoid in Figure 8, allying with employee and locality 
constituencies to get rules that favor themselves over shareholders.
67  It’s the kind of 
alliance Congress could produce.   
Or, consider the following:  A committee in California’s legislature recently 
considered  but  dropped  an  amendment  to  its  corporate  law  give  corporate 
constituencies a derivative action to sue directors for violating environmental, labor, 
and affirmative action law.
68  Although passage wasn’t a real threat, it’s at the extreme 
end of what’s considered in big states and could be considered in Congress.
69 
                                                            
62  CAL. GOV. CODE § 20090 (2005). 
63 Romano, supra note 57, at 804, 809; Jayne E. Zanglein, High Performance Investing: Harnessing 
the Power of Pension Funds to Promote Economic Growth and Workplace Integrity, 11 LAB. LAW. 59 
(1995); Deborah J. Martin, The Public Piggy Bank Goes to Market:  Public Pension Fund Investment in 
Common Stock and Fund Trustees’ Social Agenda, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39, 46-47 (1992).  See Press 
Relase,  [Cal.]  Treasurer  Angelides  Wins  CalPERS  Approval  of  Innovative  “Clean  Technologies” 
Investment  Program,  A  Key  Part  of  His  “Green  Wave”  Environmental  Investment  Initiative  (2004), 
available at www.treasurer.ca.gov/news/releases 2004/031504_clean.pdf; Marc Lifsher, CalPERS to Start 
Green Investment Program, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at C3. 
64 Mary Williams Walsh, Calpers Ouster Puts Focus on How Funds Wield Power, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 2, 2004, at C1. 
65 Cf. 1 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 6.02(b)(2) (1994) 
(target board may act in “regard for interests or groups (other than shareholders) with respect to which the 
corporation has a legitimate concern if to do so would not significantly disfavor the long-term interests of 
shareholders.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders in 
Change of Control Transactions:  Is There Any “There” There?, 75 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2002). 
66 Given the business judgment rule (and court decisions that give managers wide discretion even in 
Delaware, see Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. __ 
(2005)), these acts are largely symbolic.  But what is relevant that larger and more liberal states enact 
symbols that differ from smaller and less liberal states. 
67 Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Holloow Hopes and False Fears, 1999 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85, 96 (1999) (“[The] 1989 amendment strengthening [Pennsylvania’s constituency] 
statute was co-sponsored by the local AFL-CIO.  …”).    
68 Cal. SB 917 (2004). 
69 A cynic’s view of Congress is sometimes that “there is no rule of corporate of financial law that 
is so bad tha the United States Congress with a little attention cannot make worse.”  Perhaps it comes from a 
conservative cynic.  However bad the (semi-)private lawmaking in Delaware is from the managers’ and 
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Most states’ polities resemble the national polity more than Delaware’s does, 
and forty-one of them have produced constituency statutes.
70  More liberal states tend 
to pass broader constituency statutes, which give lip-service to managers considering 
other constituencies in all corporate matters, not just takeovers.  (Since managers have 
wide  discretion  with  the  business  judgment  rule,  much  that  is  in  such  statutes  is 
symbolic.)  And more populous stateswhere the interests in play are presumably 
wider  than  in  Delawarehave  a  greater  rate  of  reincorporation  away  and  into 
Delaware than do smaller states.
71    
Delaware has no constituency statute.  
(c)  Europe.  Consider  this  summary  of  William  Carney’s  precise  contrast  of 
American state-made corporate law with European center-made corporate law: 
Carney compared the law of the eight European Directives on company 
law with the corporate laws in the United States.  For that, he … divided 
[the directives] into 131 provisions, and searched … for similar [U.S.] 
provisions.  The result was that 95 provisions were in effect in no US-
state, 14 were in effect in all 50 states, and the remaining 22 provisions 
were adopted by [some] states.  The [95] provisions … in effect in no 
US-state  mainly  consisted  of  protections  for  creditors,  employees  and 
other stakeholders. … Carney concluded that … European harmonization 
was strongly influenced by [outside] interest groups… .
74 
 Or consider the 2001 draft of the EU’s Thirteenth Directive on takeovers.  It 
would  “require[]  the  board  of  a  target  company  to  ‘act  in  the  interest  of  all  the 
                                                            
70 Ryan J. York, Visages of Janus: The Heavy Burden of Other Constituency Anti-takeover Statutes 
on Shareholders and the Efficient Market for Corporate Control, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 187, 189 (2002).   
71 Data available from the author.  Not all the results here are statistically significant or powerful.  
But  they  point  in  the  direction  of  the  thesis  here.    One  could  interpret  the  incidence  of  the  broad 
constituency statutes in this way:  a Democratic state insists on the symbolism of the corporation as run for 
constituencies. But in less Democratic states, managers can get a simple transactional constituency statute 
for takeovers without having to pay with wider rhetoric. Managers want maximum discretion in takeovers to 
protect their own jobs, but want minimal legislative intrusioneven rhetorical intrusioninto how they 
otherwise run the firm. 
72 Cal. SB 917 (2004). 
73 A cynic’s view of Congress is sometimes that “there is no rule of corporate of financial law that 
is so bad tha the United States Congress with a little attention cannot make worse.”  Perhaps it comes from a 
conservative cynic.  However bad the (semi-)private lawmaking in Delaware is from the managers’ and 
investors’ perspective, more groups are likely to be cut in if the rulemaking moves to Washington. 
74  Mathias  M.  Siems,  Numerical  Comparative  Law,  at  3  (SSRN  working  paper,  March  2004), 
summarizing William J. Carney, The Political Economy of the Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 303, 318-27 (1997).  Cf. Carney, supra note 9, at 718 & n.7 (“other interest groups [beyond 
the organized corporate bar] do not play a significant role in influencing corporate law in the United States.  
…  This  phenomenon  is  in  distinct  contrast  to  the  situation  in  Europe.”);  Alan  Cowell,  Oslo  Journal:  
Brewmaster Breaks One Tradition but Upholds Another, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2004, at A4 (the slowness of 
promoting  women  in  “the  clubby  world  of  Norwegian  business  …  prompt[ed]  the  government  to  tell 
companies that if women do not constitute at least 40 percent of corporate boards by July 2005, they will be 
required by law to hire more women as executives.”).  Norway is not a member of the EU; the nation’s 
central political body is in Oslo. 
Below I consider cause-and-effect.  More EU corporate law may be made centrally because the EU 
is overall less conservative on such matters than is the U.S.  See Part VI (Is Delaware Cause or Effect?).  DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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company, including employment’ when responding to a bid … .  [consideration was 
given to require[ing] both the bidder and the target companies to . . . consult[] with 
employee representatives during the course of the bid.”
75  Other EU laws require this 
kind of jaw-boning consultation during downsizings and prior to asset transfers.
76  
An American big-state analogue is New York’s corporate law, which makes a 
New  York  corporation’s  ten  biggest  shareholders  personally  liable  for  employee 
wages.
77 The provision has been described as “the single most important reason why 
New York shareholders decide to incorporate in Delaware.”
78  From 1994 until 1997, 
the New York Senate “approved the bill [to repeal this liability] every year, but it had 
repeatedly  died  in  the  Assembly.    Labor  blocked  the  bill  because  [it  would  have 
deleted the shareholder guarantee] … and legislators … did not want to be seen as 
catering too much to business interests…. [In 1997, for example,] labor groups were 
adamant about retaining [the liability] and [eventually] corporate attorneys reluctantly 
acceded.”
79 
3.  Regulatory  method    (a)  Ex  post  fiduciary  duties  vs.  encompassing 
regulation.  Delaware’s  judges  are  often  celebrated  in  the  corporate  literature.  The 
state’s  primary  lawmaking  mode  is  judicial  interpretation  of  fiduciary  duties, 
punctuated by occasional legislation.  Yet the state could adopt another lawmaking 
strategy:  it could use a regulatory agency with proactive, anticipatory rulemaking 
authorityone that uncovered problems, that investigated firms, their managers, and 
their owners, and that, like the SEC, often restricts activities of firms, managers, and 
owners prospectively. 
But it hasn’t. It acts via ex post judicial review of corporate actions, focusing on 
the fairness and efficacy of shareholder-board relationships.  That’s what one would 
expect if only managers and shareholders’ representatives counted.
80  Why regulate if 
the primary parties can make a deal and the judges can arbitrate?  
Federal authorities act at times through similar modes—the Second Circuit’s use 
of the general anti-fraud rule, 10b-5, in the 1970s comes to mind—but they more often 
                                                            
75 Simon Deakin, Regulatory Competition Versus Harmonization in European Company Law, in 
REGULATORY AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION:  COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 190, 214 (Daniel C. Esty & 
Damien Geradin eds. 2001). 
76 Id. 
77 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW, § 630 (McKinney 2002).  Listed companies are exempt, but companies 
tend to de-list when they become insolvent.  Kahan & Kamar, supra note 5, at 732 n.194. 
78 Frederick Attea, State Has Hard Time Following a Lead, BUS. FIRST IN BUFFALO, Apr. 17, 2000, 
at  30.  Cf.  Michael  M.  Membrado  &  Christopher  J.  Gulotta,  Navigating  the  Formation  of  Start-Up 
Companies, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 18, 2000, at S6, S17. These sources are analyzed in Kahan & Kamar, supra 
note 20, at 732 & n.195. 
79 Dominic Bencivenga, At Long Last, a Bill, N.Y.L.J., July 31, 1997, at 5.  Cf. Richard Siegler, 
Impact  of  Business  Corporation  Law  Amendments,  N.Y.L.J.,  Oct.  29,  1997,  at  3,  4  (Section  630  not 
repealed due to “strong opposition from labor unions”). 
80 The rhetoric of the law covering board-shareholder relationships has analytic differences:  is it a 
contract whose holes have to be filled in, or is it a fiduciary relationship?  But in each analytic riff, the 
relationship that counts is between managers and shareholders, and the mode of regulation is narrow and ex 
post, not broad and prospective.  Compare FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
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act through a regulator:  the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC lacks full 
authority over corporate law, but where it can act, it regularly does so prospectively, 
via  regulation,  via  civil  fines,  andwith  other  federal  authorities’  helpvia 
incarceration.  Further,  consider  Congress’s  Sarbanes-Oxley  corporate  governance 
reforms of 2002.  That Act raised the obligations of managers, boards, and institutional 
investors.    Yet,  “[it]  was  viewed  as  …  too  prescriptive  and  harsh  to  the  financial 
community and corporations.”
81 These directly affected groups, who pay the initial 
costs of these changes, are the very groups that dominate Delaware. Hence, one would 
not have expected such reforms to come out of Delaware.  And they did not.
82 
(b)  Arbitration vs. prosecution.  Would managers and institutional stockholders 
want their disputes dealt with via criminal prosecution or via arbitration? Presumably 
the latter.  While each side has reason to want to criminalize the other’s derelictions, it 
would be hard to criminalize the other’s without criminalizing its own.  Both prefer to 
avoid criminal penalties, and favor having a wise arbitratorcalled, say, the Delaware 
Chancellordecide their disputes without criminal sanctions.  And that’s just about 
how Delaware law works.   
Corporate and financial prosecutions emerge in big states, like New York (think 
of N.Y. Attorney-General Elliot Spitzer’s recent prosecutions), or in a United States 
Attorney’s  office  (think  of  Rudolph  Giuliani’s  late-1980s  prosecutions),  not  in 
Delaware.  A franchise-tax motivated polity that responds to operating managers’ and 
investment managers’ preferences would not heavily use as its instrument of choice 
regulating and jailingand Delaware has not.   
 
IV.  POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DELAWARE-FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
A. Triggering Federal Action 
 
Thus, the two main players in American corporate law generally want the game 
played  in  Delaware.    What  would  move  the  game  to  Washington?  A  disgruntled 
Delaware player’s appeal is the main trigger we’ve thus far examined.  (Other states’ 
actions are less likely to goad federal authorities into action, because other states are 
neither likely to strongly affect the national economysince they aren’t the home to 
half of corporate Americanor likely to motivate America’s managers or its investors 
to seek federal help.
83) 
National  political  forces,  when  powerful  enough  to  temporarily  overcome 
Delaware’s  agenda-setting  power,  could  also  move  the  game  from  Delaware  to 
Washington.  Sarbanes-Oxley is one example. The public outcry over the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals disabled managers’ ability to oppose federal legislation.  In fact, 
                                                            
81 Rabihollah Rezaee & Pankaj K. Jain, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Securities Market 
Behavior: Early Evidence 9 (SSRN working paper, Dec. 2003). 
82  Thompson,  supra  note  39.  Cf.  Alan  Schwartz  &  Robert  E.  Scott, The  Political  Economy  of 
Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995) (analogous lawmaking results when interest groups 
dominate American Law Institute or state Uniform Law commissions). 
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nearly every decade in the twentieth century had a corporate issue of such importance 
that the issue moved into the federal arena, or seriously threatened to do so.
84 
Political scientists have sketched the general characteristics of issues that burst 
onto the congressional agenda. An issue can sit on the policy agenda for years and go 
nowhere in Congress. Then a focusing event occurs and the issue moves onto the 
congressional agenda for action.
85  
1. Scandals, and public-oriented action.  Congress sets aside Delaware-based, 
quasi-private lawmaking when the media show gross corporate wrongdoing or when 
poor  national  economic  performance  is  plausibly  tied  to  corporate  governance.
86 
Congress thus acts sporadically, but sporadic doesn’t mean unimportant.  Scandals 
serve as focusing events that motivate national politicians. True, Delaware can’t fully 
control scandals.  They don’t always arise directly from corporate law lapses and, even 
when they do, the companies involved might not have been Delaware-chartered firms.  
Enron was not a Delaware company.  Nevertheless, any corporate scandal induces 
scrutiny,  and  if  Delaware  seems  incompetent  or  in  its  interests’  pockets,  stronger 
federal action is thereby made more likely.
87 
 Or, in terms of the preference aggregation model from the earlier diagrams, at 
times a populist or a public-policy idea—or their underlying interests—gets enough 
power to dominate the congressional agenda, and the forces for managerial autonomy 
are weaker than usual. At that point, the populists or the productivity-oriented public-
policy people can dominate without allied interest groups from inside the corporation. 
As Phil Gramm, the conservative anti-regulatory Senator, said when the Enron and 
WorldCom  scandals  hit  and  Sarbanes-Oxley  was  under  discussion:  “In  the 
environment we are in, virtually anything can pass.  Everybody  is trying to outdo 
everybody  else.”
88  The  Business  Roundtable  at  first  opposed  the  legislation,
89 
preferring  self-regulation,  but  joined  the  bandwagon  when  legislation  seemed 
inevitable and popular reaction made it too uncomfortable to stay opposed.  Only later, 
                                                            
84  Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 3, at 610-34.  See supra p. 5. 
85  JOHN  W.  KINGDON,  CONGRESSMEN’S  VOTING  DECISION  264  (1973);  JOHN  W.  KINGDON, 
AGENDAS,  ALTERNATIVES,  AND  PUBLIC  POLICIES  94-99  (2d  ed.  2003).  Cf.  Roberta  Romano,  The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance (working paper, 2004) (MS at 2-3). 
86 See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the 
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990). 
87 This process parallels a once-classic view of American political history in which private interests 
produce wealth, but become corrupt or incompetent (or corrupt the State), and then national  reformers 
rebuild the private sector.  Jacksonian democracy, the Progressive movement, and the New Deal are said to 
illustrate. E.g., RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 234 (1955); ROBERT H. WEIBE, THE SEARCH 
FOR ORDER 45, 52-53 (1967); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON (1945). 
88  Rezaee & Jain, supra note 81, at 7.  
89  Letter, dated May 20, 2002, from John Castellani, President, The Business Roundtable, to Paul 
S.  Sarbanes,  Chairman,  Sen.  Comm.  on  Banking,  Housing  and  Urban  Affiars,  Re:  Public  Company 
Accounting  Reform  and  Investor  Protection  Act  of  2002  (opposing  key  provisions  of  Sarbanes’  bill); 
Arianna Huffington, Fiscal Reforms? The Fix Is In: Nothing Will Change Without Public Outrage, L.A. 
TIMES, July 11, 2002.  DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
 
34
 
when the fires subsided, did the Business Roundtable start seeking to roll-back the 
regulation.
90 
2. Police patrols vs. fire alarms. Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz 
identify two main means by which Congress controls federal agencies: police patrols 
and fire alarms. Congress could continuously keep an eye on what the agency is doing, 
via  regular  police  patrols.  Or  it  could  sit  back  and  do  nothing  unless  constituents 
scream, fire alarms go off, and the media spots a big issue—again, a focusing event.
91 
Congress,  I  submit,  primarily  oversees  Delaware’s  corporate  law  via  the  second 
mechanism; the fire alarm is a scandal or bad economic performance. And the SEC 
serves  as  Congress’s  secondary  police  patrol,  keeping  an  eye  on  the  American 
corporation via continuous monitoring. 
  
B.  Parallels  to  the  Federal  Reserve  System:  Delaware  as  the 
Accidental Agency 
 
The Delaware-federal relationship resembles the Federal Reserve-congressional 
relationship.  The  parallel  is  apt,  in  that  the  Federal  Reserve  is  one  of  the  more 
independent  agencies,  and  Delaware  clearly  need  not  jump  every  time  Congress 
moves.  In fact, Delaware is freer than even the Federal Reserve.  While Congress 
often  structures  agencies  and  their  procedures  to  respond  to  congressional  will,
92 
Congress didn’t build Delaware. It isn’t in the loop in appointing Delaware officials, as 
it  is  for  federal  agencies.  Congress  often  calls  in  agency  personnel  to  testify,  and 
thereby  influences  agency  preferences  and  actions;  while  federal  players  do 
communicate with Delaware players, it’s without the intensity of regular congressional 
hearings.  Congress  determines  agency  budgets,  but  it  doesn’t  regulate  Delaware’s 
franchise fees. 
1. In Delaware’s insulation. Analysts often want to insulate monetary policy 
from unstable political demands. The polity prefers short-term monetary laxity, the 
usual story goes, and politicians facing an election in a few months would give voters 
that shortsighted policy at the expense of long-term growth.
93 This view puts a positive 
spin on insulating the Federal Reserve from day-to-day political pressure. 
                                                            
90  Dan Roberts & Adrian Michaels, Sarbanes and Oxley Under Fire in US, FIN. TIMES, June 14, 
2004, at 16; John Castellani, Editorial, Effective Reforms in Place, USA TODAY, Mar. 22, 2004, at 20A. 
91  Mathew  D.  McCubbins  &  Thomas  Schwartz,  Congressional  Oversight  Overlooked:  Police 
Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).  Cf. Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, 
Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 96 (1994); 
EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 40, at 25-27. 
92  Mathew  D.  McCubbins,  Roger  Noll  &  Barry  R.  Weingast,  Administrative  Procedures  as 
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger Noll & 
Barry  R.  Weingast,  Structure  and  Process,  Politics  and  Policy:  Administrative  Arrangements  and  the 
Political  Control  of  Agencies, 75  VA.  L.  REV.  431  (1989).  Cf. Barry  R.  Weingast  &  Mark J.  Moran, 
Bureaucratic  Discretion  or  Congressional  Control:  Regulatory  Policymaking  by  the  Federal  Trade 
Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).  
93 Cf. ALLAN DRAZEN, POLITICAL ECONOMY IN MACROECONOMICS 144 (2000), citing Kenneth 
Rogoff, The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target, 100 Q. J. ECON. 1169 
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Central  bank  independence,  even  if  short  of  total  independence,  is  seen  as 
critical to implementing that policy. The public wants immediate economic gain, such 
as the highest possible immediate employment. Alan Blinder, a former vice-chair of 
the  Federal  Reserve,  argues  that  a  key  reason  for  independence  is  that  “monetary 
policy, by its very nature, requires a long time horizon.”
94 Presumably he means very 
long compared to the elected political institutions’ and the public’s usual short horizon: 
So,  if  politicians  made  monetary  policy  on  a  day-to-day  basis,  the 
temptation to reach for short-term gains at the expense of the future (that 
is,  to  inflate  too  much)  would  be  hard  to resist.  Knowing  this,  many 
governments wisely try to depoliticize monetary policy by … putting it 
in  the  hands  of  unelected  technocrats  with  long  terms  of  office  and 
insulation from the hurly-burly of politics.
95 
Ensuing analyses have looked at how much the Federal Reserve still defers on 
big issues to the elected branches’ wishes.
96  Some political scientists see the issue as 
even more basic: 
The main mechanism by which democracy is thought to hinder growth 
[is] pressure[] for immediate consumption, which reduce[s] investment.  
Only [governments] that are institutionally insulated from such pressures 
can resist them, and democratic states are not. 
*  *  * 
The heart of the neo-liberal research program is to find institutions that 
enable the state to do what it should but disable it from doing what it 
should not.
97 
Other have similarly asserted that: 
Congress  [sometimes  wants]  a  policy  that  would  not  get  majority 
support.  The classic example is this:  Congress [wants] a low-inflation 
monetary policy, knowing that it will have an incentive to renege.  … 
[So] Congress delegates authority over monetary policy to a conservative 
agency,  and  delegates  monitoring  to  a  conservative  committee  that 
provides political shelter for the agency’s decisions.
98 
The  analogy  to  Delaware  corporate  lawmaking  needs  little  stretching.  When 
Delaware, like the Federal Reserve, decides first, Congress often acquiesces. American 
corporate law, by usually giving Delaware first crack at making the rules, reduces 
political pressure on America’s corporate lawmakers. Unelected Delaware chancellors 
                                                            
94 ALAN BLINDER, CENTRAL BANKING IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 55 (1998); see sources cited in 
DRAZEN, supra note 93, at 142 n.19, 143.  
95 BLINDER, supra note 94, at 56-57. 
96  For  indicators  of  deference,  see  Thomas  Havrilesky,  Monetary  Policy  Signaling  from  the 
Administration to the Federal Reserve, 20 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 83, 84, 86 (1988), and sources 
cited therein; Nathaniel Beck, Elections and the Fed: Is There a Political Monetary Cycle?, 31 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 194, 194 (1987); John T. Williams, The Political Manipulation of Macroeconomic Policy, 84 AM. POL. 
SCI.  REV.  767  (1990);  George  A.  Krause,  Federal  Reserve  Policy  Decision  Making:  Political  and 
Bureaucratic Influences, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 124, 124 (1994). 
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with long tenure, who are structurally insulated from hurly-burly of national politics, 
typically first make corporate rules. The Delaware legislature acts next. It listens to a 
corporate bar committee, which is just about as insulated from national politics as are 
the Delaware courts: the bar committee represents managers and shareholders (and 
themselves),  and  the  Delaware  legislature  is  less  worried  than  Congress  might  be 
about, say, general environmental policy or labor relations, and more concerned about 
that franchise tax.  
2.  In  its  porosity.  In  most  democratic  polities  the  central  banker  can  be 
dismissed, much as the federal authorities can oust Delaware from making American 
corporate law: 
Lohmann (1992) suggest[s] appoint[ing] a conservative central banker, 
but [keeping] the option to dismiss him at a cost. Her argument is that the 
high variance of unemployment with … [a] conservative central banker 
…    is  much  like  using  a  rule  with  an  escape  clause  [for  extreme 
circumstances]….
99 
The Federal Reserve watches and reacts to election returns, and can thereby 
falter  in  making  good  long-term  monetary  policy;  thus  the  independent  agency’s 
insulation can dampen, but not eliminate, politics’ short-term influence. Delaware is 
similar:  Federal authorities sometimes take corporate lawmaking power away from 
Delaware. Delaware, seeking to stymie federal action so that the state maintains its 
authority,  sometimes  goes  just  far  enough  to  deter  the  federal  authorities  from 
acting.
100 It considers general public opinion, which could influence elected federal 
lawmakers. Both the Fed’s and Delaware’s positioning here resembles a monopolist’s 
limit pricing:  not so high as to attract entry. 
Delaware, like the Federal Reserve, is autonomous, but not fully so. It cannot 
get too far out from political currents, because if it does, federal authorities can, and 
do, intervene. The President appoints the chair of the Federal Reserve every four years 
and appoints a few Fed governors every few years. The Federal Reserve normally 
buffers  policy  from  the  general  polity,  but  it  cannot  readily  defeat  a  determined 
polity.
101  
Moreover,  just  as  the  Federal  Reserve  enhances  its  independence  by  linking 
itself to “a supportive constituency in the financial services industry,”
102 Delaware can 
keep  some  autonomy  from  Congress  by  linking  itself  to  managers.  But  linking 
themselves to powerful interest groups can distort policy:  Bankers, to the detriment of 
                                                            
99  DRAZEN,  supra  note  93,  at  145.  See  also  GØSTA  ESPING-ANDERSON,  THREE  WORLDS  OF 
WELFARE CAPITALISM 14-15 (1990). 
100  See examples and structure discussed in Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 3, at 607-34. 
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others in the polity, could overly influence the Fed.  Similarly, although Delaware’s 
insulation  usually  lets  managers  and  investors  work  out  a  contractarian  result  by 
themselves, there are times and issues when the contractarian result isn’t in the public 
interest.  While agencies are often captured by those they regulate, it’s not likely that 
Congress would create an agency that directly depends on interest groups the way 
Delaware does for $500 million of franchise taxes. 
And lastly, Delaware, like the Fed, often serves Congress’s interest by taking 
primary responsibility for corporate regulationand the heat that comes with itfrom 
Congress.   If something goes wrong, Congress isn’t the first to be blamed.
103 
3. In separating policy domains.  Congressional creation of the SEC raises the 
issue  of  whether  Congress,  when  it  acts  in  corporate  law,  also  tries  to  separate 
corporate policy from other policies. Once when it acted powerfully in the corporate 
area, in 1933 and 1934, it created the SEC for corporate issues, and put the American 
corporation’s labor issues in another venue, the National Labor Relations Board. Thus, 
we could say that Delaware’s interest groups need not worry too much about Congress 
expanding the agenda: when Congress acts on corporate matters, it keeps the other 
players outside of the corporate action. It implements general policies via external 
arrangements—a National Labor Relations Board, an Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration,  an  Internal  Revenue  Service—not  within  the  corporate  governance 
structure. 
This  observation  does  not  make  the  Delaware-federal  institutional  divide 
irrelevant. For Congress to shield the corporation from the swarming interest groups, it 
needed an institutional means to do so. Creating the SEC was one way; tolerating 
Delaware  another.    One  can  speculate  that  had  Delaware  not  evolved  as  it  has, 
Congress might have built a federal agency to somewhat insulate corporate lawmaking 
from the hurly-burly of national politics. With Delaware available, Congress was able 
to use it as a distant, quasi-federal agency.   
4. In reducing the time inconsistency problem.  A reason for Federal Reserve 
autonomy  is  the  need  to  maintain  a  consistent  economic  policy  over  time  without 
succumbing to short-term political payoffs..  A legislature can’t, say, easily stick to a 
low-inflation  policy,  if  political  pressures  develop  in  an  election  year  favoring  an 
inflationary  policy.
104    Corporate  policy  could  be  similar.    Over  the  long  run  a 
business-oriented  policy  could  produce  more  investment,  more  growth,  and  better 
economic  performance.    But  political  pressures  might  push  policymakers  to  attack 
shareholders.  A polity where the initial corporate decisions are made by a state like 
Delaware  dependent  on  shareholders  and  managers  for  tax  revenues  reduces  this 
prospect.  
5. In processing information. The federal-Delaware institutional structure affects 
legal outcomes, because some interest groups have more muscle in Delaware than they 
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PERSPECTIVES, supaa note __,  at 95, 98-99 (“where Congress can avoid potentially damaging political 
opposition from special-interest groups by allocating the responsibility for a particularly controversial issue 
to state and local governments (as is the case with the issue of abortion)”). 
104  BLINDER, supra note 94, at 55-56. DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
 
38
 
have in Congress. But there’s more than just interest group differences between the 
two  lawmaking  levels;  there  are  informational  differences  as  well.  “[I]nstitutional 
arrangements may reflect the need to acquire and disseminate information in addition 
to (or instead of) the need to solve distributional issues. Committees may be powerful 
in a legislature not (only) because they monopolize agenda power but (also) because 
they  monopolize  information  and  expertise.”
105  This  modern  political  science  view 
corresponds to an older view in the legal academy about administrative expertise.
106 
Congress may tolerate Delaware because it specializes in corporate law issues, similar 
to how a federal agency specializes and becomes expert. Had Delaware not emerged as 
the de facto maker of American state corporate law, Congress might have created an 
expert administrative agency to make corporate law, one like the Fed or the SEC, or 
expanded the powers of one already in place. In this view of the current structure, 
Delaware still creates the corporate law that Congress wants, or at least tolerates, just 
like an administrative agency rules within the ambit of Congress’s parameters. It’s the 
accidental agency. 
*  *  * 
The analogy to the Fed is good but imperfect.  For instance, some American 
political players are more attached to federalism and state power as vital to American 
democracy than they are to the autonomy of federal agencies.  Similarly, senators at 
times get their peers’ deference on matters of local significance, but senators will not 
accord the same deference to policy matters in the agencies.  As a result Delaware’s 
senators may at times seek to deter federal action and other senators feel federalist 
comity compels deference.  And congressional and presidential control over agencies 
are much tighter, as we have seen, and the interest group influences looser, than they 
are for Delaware. 
And whereas the Fed’s buffering is temporal; Delaware aims to narrow policy 
breadth.  Thus even if everyone wants the Fed’s policy when we’re planning the long 
future, when that future time finally arrives, short-term interests would dominate if the 
buffer did not slow down the political juggernaut. For Delaware, the interests outside 
the core corporate law players—the public interest groups, public-policy-makers, and 
employees—have a public interest vision, but theirs fundamentally differs from that 
held by the corporate players. In the end, although the particulars and degree differ, the 
general institutional role is still the same for the  Fed and for Delaware as buffers 
against immediate political pressure. 
 
C. And How Delaware Affects Congress 
 
1. In justifying strong regulation. Congress, knowing that Delaware provides 
corporate  flexibility,  can  more  easily  enact  rigid  rules,  rules  that  it  knows  will  be 
tempered in Delaware.  If Delaware seems weak, Congress can be strong. 
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2. In facilitating anti-corporate posturing.  Similarly, if Delaware provides a 
contractarian corporate law and a good forum for arbitration, Congress can more easily 
attack  corporations.    Delaware  can  take  care  of  the  core  efficiency  issues,  and 
Congress doesn’t need to be overly wary that it is severely damaging the corporate 
contract when it makes populist laws, because Delaware can mitigate the costs. 
Moreover, those in Congress who get support from Delaware’s primary interest 
groups don’t need to pass laws favoring them to get their clients’ support.  As Jonathan 
Macey points out in analogous circumstances, all that the clients need to know is that 
their patrons successfully blocked federal action; Delaware takes care of the rest
107 
3. In giving Congress cover and deniability. If something goes wrong, Congress 
need not take responsibility.  It doesn’t need even to point a finger.  Everyone knows 
states make corporate law.  If there’s a scandal, or a failure, the states have failed, and 
the U.S. Congress can ride in to the rescue.
108 
4.  In  avoiding  a  full  federal  corporate  takeover.    Why  don’t  noncorporate 
interests  who  would  do  better  in  Congress  force  the  game  to  move  there?    When 
there’s a scandal or other focusing event, they should realize that they’d do better over 
the long-run if they institutionalize a federal presence in making basic corporate law. 
Three explanations are plausible.  When the time comes, managers and investors 
see their ox about to be gored, and gored in a permanent way, so they would intensely 
react.    Since  the  federalizing  interests  get  enough  of  what  they  want  via  external 
constraints, and via a rule responding just to the particular issue on the agenda, they 
recede from federalizing Delaware.  
The second is that the serendipitous alignment of interests, policymakers, and 
scandal just hasn’t been right for full nationalization of corporate law.
109  It’s almost 
happened, but it just missed, because some key player just wasn’t on board when the 
issue was ripe. 
A third explanation is more interestingalbeit more complex.  Focus on the 
split of interests at the federal level.  Some interests and associated policymakers want 
maximum corporate productivity, others focus on fairness.  The media we suppose 
turns on the scandal lights for a time on corporate America, but those bright lights turn 
away  when  another  issue  grabs  the  media’s  attention.    The  productivity-oriented 
policymakers  fear  that  interests  inimical  to  productivity  would  capture  the  federal 
machinery to often when the media loses interest in corporate lawmaking.  They favor 
a specific rule to ameliorate the current problem, but do not want to institutionalize a 
federalization all corporate lawmaking, fearing that the inimical interests would then 
find it worthwhile to lobby to affect the new federal institution that could mandate 
corporate  structures.    Productivity-oriented  policymakers  (and  their  associated 
interests) prefer external constraints, not internal structures, that promote the fairness 
goals.    (And  some  oppose  the  fairness  goals  entirely.)    If  a  federal  corporate 
rulemaking institution in place, the fairness-oriented interests would have reason to 
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lobby the corporate lawmaking institution, in a way that they can’t succeed at when 
corporate law is in Delaware.
110  So the productivity-oriented policymakers oppose 
managers  (and  maybe  investors)  on  the  specific  issue,  but  join  managers  (and 
investors) in preferring not to federalize the future.
111 
If  Delaware  weren’t  available,  these  veto  possibilities  over  institutionalizing 
federal corporate lawmaking wouldn’t be available. 
 
V.  CORPORATE THEORY MEETS POLITICAL THEORY 
 
A. The Contractarian Paradigm 
 
1. What is it? A standard view is that corporate law should be contractarian, 
reflecting the terms shareholders and managers would have adopted had they built the 
corporation up from basic contract law. Those terms should be default rules, malleable 
for  shareholders  and  managers  that  want  differing  relationships.  Mandatory  terms 
should be few. Analysts argue that Delaware corporate law comes close to reflecting 
the contractarian agenda.
112 
2. How the public choice structure makes the contractarian paradigm possible.  
Delaware’s lawmaking structure makes contractarian results more likely than would 
congressionally-made  law.  Essentially,  Delaware’s  corporate  lawyers  propose  new 
corporate  law  to  Delaware  lawmakers.  The  form  is  a  meta-contract:  investors, 
managers  and  their  lawyers  are  represented  on  the  bar  association’s  corporate 
committees; Delaware’s corporate law is itself a quasi-contract between managers and 
shareholders,  written  by  the  two  and  enforced  by  the  legislature.  And  the  laws  as 
passed  also  typically  defer  to  further  firm-by-firm  shareholder-manager  contractual 
fine-tuning. 
The two parties to this corporate meta-contract prefer flexibility for themselves, 
while third parties might prefer more mandatory terms attuned to their own interests.  
The  third  partiesand  their  mandatory  termswould  be  more  viable  in  a  federal 
forum than in a Delaware forum. Or to heighten the relative power of other groups, 
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explain  why  shareholders  don’t  run  to  Congress  on  every  little  issue,  but  stay  with  Delaware  or  limit 
themselves to a shareholder-oriented agency like the SEC.   
112  EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 80, at 4. DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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corporate law might diminish the power of the two Delaware players.
113  Day-to-day 
American corporate law, however, doesn’t heighten those other groups’ power.
114 
3.    Limits  to  the  contractarian  paradigm.  Delaware  facilitates  that  contract 
between investors and managers because the other players are absent or weak. Others 
cannot by themselves move the franchise tax to another state.  When other parties want 
to affect the political calculus, they typically find the federal authorities a friendlier 
venue. 
Early New Jersey corporate law again exemplifies. When New Jersey became 
the Mother of Trusts, it acted consistently with the contractarian model. It allowed 
corporations  to  combine,  merge,  and  form  holding  companies.  When  the  contract 
attracted public attention, federal authorities tossed aside the contractarian result. The 
Sherman  Act  is  the  legislative  exemplar;  the  Supreme  Court’s  1911  Standard  Oil 
decision its early judicial culmination.
115 
Similarly,  when  populist  and  progressive  forces  wanted  to  cut  the  power  of 
financial institutions, they turned to federal authorities to keep financial institutions 
small and weak.
116 Once Congress cut financial power—symbolized by J.P. Morgan’s 
interests—rhetorically with the Pujo investigation in 1913 and more vigorously with 
the  fragmentation  of  banking  and,  in  the  1930s,  with  the  Glass-Steagall  Act, 
policymakers then deferred to state-law corporate contracts. Populists and progressives 
altered corporate structure, but primarily at the federal level, not via New Jersey’s and 
Delaware’s corporate law.  If a state’s corporate law became too mandatory, in a way 
that investors and managers abhorred, they could move the firm to another state.  But if 
more corporate law were federal, the interest groups who would want more mandatory 
law would have more reason to lobby for it, since if they succeeded the target firms 
couldn’t slip away to another state.
117 
 
                                                            
113  For  example,  Delaware  lawif sensitive  to  outsiders’  goals`might  bar  shareholders  from 
serving on the board, or require as a matter of corporate law that the firm must notify all employees prior to 
any  major  downsizing,  or  mandate  that  the  board  present  mergers  to  both  company  sharreholders  and 
employees, with the employees for their prior consultation or approval. French and German results differ, as 
German codetermination shows. 
114 Or, to flip the analysis:  Delaware exports its narrow notion of the corporation to the other 49 
states,  whose  voters  would  from  time-to-time  become  third-parties  to  Delaware  corporate  contracts. 
Sometimes  Delaware  incorporates  a  soft  form  of  that  outside  opinion  into  its  law,  sometimes  federal 
authorities insist on that result.  Cf. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Matter?  Political Choice in a 
Federal  Republic,  89  J.  POL.  ECON.  152,  153 (1981) (“interstate  spill-ins  ands  spill-outs  can  alter the 
substance of national legislation”). 
115 22 U.S. 1 (1911). 
116 MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE  FINANCE  28-32  (1994).    Insurance  company  laws,  which  came  from  the  states,  are  the 
exception. 
117 In modern times, when Nader-types sought to reform the corporation, they looked to federal 
institutions, not state corporate law, to re-set the corporate contract. RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976). They sought directors who would have separate 
portfolios  of  responsibility,  representing  nine  categories:  employees,  consumer,  the  environment, 
shareholders,  legal  compliance,  finance,  marketing,  management,  and  research.  Id.  at  125,  180  et  seq. 
(About half their proposals were mainstream; half would have greatly pushed the envelope outward.) DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
 
42
 
B. The Internal Affairs Norm 
 
1.  What is it?  The relationships among shareholders, and between shareholders 
and  managers,  are  seen  as  internal  to  an  entity  sitting  within  a  single  state,  and 
therefore are properly  matters for state regulation.  External buying and selling  of 
securities across state lines is for the SEC and the securities laws to regulate.  The line 
between  internal  and  external  is  surely  not  bright,  but  the  distinction  has  been 
important in defining the national and state spheres of corporate lawmaking.
118  The 
formal doctrine originates outside the federal-state divide in state-to-state with choice 
of  law  rules  in  which  states  defer  to  the  incorporating  state’s  rules  for  the  firm’s 
internal affairs;
119 but the internal/external line has also come to roughly mark the 
traditional boundary between the state and federal domains.  And some courts say that 
the  SEC  cannot  move  into  state  internal  affairs  without  clear  congressional 
authorization, but can go beyond the precise terms of the statute to define ambiguous 
grants to regulate securities trading.
120 The internal/external distinction is part of the 
debate over who should make American corporate law.
121 
2. The internal affairs norm as crude interest group public choice.  Behind the 
internal affairs standard is the realpolitik that deferring to states on internal affairs is 
equivalent to deferring to manager-shareholder interests. While the doctrine surely has 
a life apart from the interests that benefit from its use, for some players the ideology 
may  only  thinly  mask  self-interest.    As  Gordon  Tullock  remarked,  most  citizens 
“realize that the government can be expected to do things in their personal interest only 
if it at least superficially fits the public image.”
122 Many are surely sincere in their 
ideology, which matches their self-interest. 
                                                            
118 See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).  For its choice of law origins, 
see  Note,  The  Internal  Affairs  Doctrine:  Theoretical  Justifications  and  Tentative  Explanations  for  its 
Continued Primacy, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1480 (2002). CTS nearly merged comity with doctrine, i.e., by 
seeing internal affairs as constitutionally in the states’ domain. CTS at 91. The conceptfederal authorities 
regulate external trading of stock, while state authorities regulate internal relationships among shareholders, 
directors, and managerspreexisted Chief Justice Rehnquist’s use of internal affairs vocabulary to describe 
it. 
119 John Coates IV, The Legal Origins of the (Unimportant) U.S. “Market” for Corporate Charters 
(Harvard Law School working paper, Oct. 18, 2004); Daniel J.H. Greenwod, Democracy and Delaware: The 
Mysterious Race to the Top/Bottom (SSRN working paper) (questioning whether the constitutional and 
choice of law doctrinal bases for states’ deferring to the incorporating state are strong). 
120 Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, [410-17] (D.C. Cir. 1990).  State advocates are 
quick to mark off this limit to SEC authority.  E. Norman Veasey, The Judiciary’s Contribution to the 
Reform of Corporate Governance, 4 J. CORP. L. STUD. 225, 230 (1994) (Veasey was then Delaware’s Chief 
Justice). 
121  See,  e.g.,  TASK  FORCE  ON  SHAREHOLDERS  PROPOSALS  OF  THE  COMM.  ON  FEDERAL 
REGULATION  OF  SECURITIES,  SECTION  OF  BUS.  LAW  OF  THE  AMERICAN  BAR  ASS’N,  REPORT  ON 
PROPOSED CHANGES IN PROXY RULES AND REGULATIONS REGARDING PROCEDURES FOR THE ELECTION 
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 19, 23, 25 (2004).  The task force, chaired by two respected lawyers who often 
represent managers, said that the SEC shareholder access proposals, see supra p., “raise[d] significant …  
federalism concerns … .”  And “federal regulation of … proxies may impinge on state substantive law and 
raise federalism issues… .  Exactly where that line exists has not been clearly delineated … .” 
122 Gordon Tullock, Future Directions for Rent-Seeking Research, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
RENT-SEEKING 465, 473 (Charles K. Rowley, Robert D. Tollison & Gordon Tullock eds., 1988). DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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The ideologythe internal affairs normis stated, sometimes grudgingly, by 
SEC  commissioners,  by  Congress,  by  the  courts,
123  and,  more  relevantly  and  with 
more respect, by corporate players. Bruce Atwater, a big-company CEO and major 
corporate spokesman in the 1980s, opposed federal preemption of state takeover law 
and  when  doing  so  invoked  the  tradition  that  states  define  and  create  the 
corporation.
124  The  norm’s  effect  is  to  restrain  the  federal  authorities.  When  it’s 
successfully invoked, it impedes federal action. It weakens players who are stronger on 
the  federal  level,  and  boosts  those  stronger  at  the  state  level.  It  strengthens  the 
contractarian paradigm, because the two primary contracting players are strongest at 
the state level. 
 
VI.  IS DELAWARE CAUSE OR EFFECT? 
 
A. Means and Ends 
 
1. The median voter and the institutional structure.  Two views key modern 
political science are at work here.  In one, a democratic polity does what the median 
voter wants.
125  In another, agenda setting is key because coalitions are many, politics 
is arrayed in too many dimensions for there to be a median voter, and, as Kenneth 
Shepsle and Barry Weingast showed, institutional structure shapes the agenda, which 
can  determine  the  outcome.
126    I  next  integrate  both  views  into  the  public  choice 
foundation to American corporate lawmaking. 
2.  Does  the  American  voter  want  conservative  corporate  law?  Are  broad 
political  concerns  kept  out  of  American  corporate  law  because  of  the  institutional 
structure that has Delaware setting the agenda, with the federal authorities thereafter 
deciding  whether  to  displace  the  Delaware  decision?  Or  are  such  broad  political 
concerns kept out because the American polity doesn’t give them much weight and 
thus tolerates Delaware’s excluding them? Would substantive results be the same, even 
if all corporate law were made at the national level? 
                                                            
123 CTS, at 91 (“It thus is an accepted part of the business landscape in this country for States to 
create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their 
shares.”). Internal affairs aficionados refer to Delaware and its siblings as “States,” and not “states.” 
124 See Witnesses at Takeover Bill Hearing Split on Preemption of State Regulation, 19 SEC. REG. 
& L. REP. 851, 851 (June 12, 1987).  Atwater didn’t formally invoke the internal affairs vocabulary, but 
used the concept of states as the best maker of corporate law. 
125 DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958); cf. ANTHONY DOWNS, 
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 115-18 (1957). 
126  Kenneth  A.  Shepsle  &  Barry  R.  Weingast,  Structure-Induced  Equilibrium  and  Legislative 
Choice, 37 PUB. CHOICE 503, 504 (1981) (“real-world legislative practices … constrain … the instability of 
[pure majority] rule by restricting the domain and the content of legislative exhange”).  Which view arises 
depends on what kind of decisionmaking is investigated.  When the issue is uni-dimensional, the median 
voter  theorem  is  central;  when  the  issues  are  multi-dimensional,  institutitional  structure  is  central.  Cf. 
Richard  D.  McKelvey,  Intransitivities  in  Multidimensional  Voting  Models  and  Some  Implications  for 
Agenda Control, 12 ECON. THEORY 472 (1976) (one can “design voting procedures which, starting from 
any  given  point,  will  end  up  [anywhere]  in  the  space  of  alternatives”);  Charles  R.  Plott,  A  notion  of 
equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 787 (1967). DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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The view that federalism does not matter here can come in two varieties.  In the 
first, the American polity keeps the categories separate, then limits the corporation’s 
range of action via external constraints, not internal governance. In the second, interest 
group  interplay  would  lead  to  the  same  result  wherever  corporate  law  is  made: 
shareholders might find that managerial agency costs are not so high in the United 
States to make it worth allying with another group to reduce them further because the 
payoff to the third group would exceed the likely agency cost savings. Similarly, if 
managers sought more autonomy by allying with employees, shareholders might just 
give  the  managers  that  autonomy  themselves,  for  fear  that  an  alliance  between 
managers and employees would take more out of shareholders’ pockets. This dynamic 
could play out in Congress as easily as in Delaware. Does Delaware then cause narrow 
corporate law, or is it its effect?   
We cannot know for sure, because we cannot run the real-world experiment of 
turning corporate law off in Delaware and requiring that Congress make all corporate 
law for two or three decades to see if the tilt changes. But we can reconcile cause and 
effect. The American polity is ready to defer to the corporate players on most corporate 
law issues, but needs an institutional mechanism. Delaware is the mechanism. Were it 
unavailable,  that  deference  would  be  weaker,  and  corporate  players  would  want 
another institutional buffer. 
 
B. Restraining the Corporation: External Bumpers vs. Internal Brakes 
 
I  have  argued  that  Delaware’s  franchise  tax  defines  its  interest  groupsas 
shareholders  and  managers.    And  I  have  argued  that  Congress  is  not  so  limited:  
Groups  like  environmentalists,  employees,  labor  unions,  economic  policymakers, 
average voters, and so on would have a say in Congress. 
Congress  has  given  those  groups  an  Environmental  Protection  Agency,  an 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, a National Labor Relations Board, a 
Council of Economic Advisors, and other agencies to constrain the corporation.  So, 
one  might  argue,  the  law  does  confine  corporations  and  their  managers,  but  the 
confining  rules  just  come  in  a  form  other  than  laws  regulating  internal  corporate 
governance,, such as boardroom representation of third party interests. 
But even when trueas it largely islaw thereby acts not through brakes inside 
the firm but through external constraints on the firm. Corporate internal relations are 
(quasi-)contractual, uncomplicated by outside alliances and outside rulemaking. The 
internal workings of the corporation do not fully reflect the workings of the polity.  
They could, and in some nations they do, but here they don’t. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The  standard  story  is  that  states  make  corporate  law,  with  state  competition 
critically determining its content. This may be so, but perhaps the relationship between 
the  states  and  Washington is  just  as  determinative,  because  federal  authorities  can 
displace the states, and often do so on big issues. Corporate law issues can always go 
federal or attract federal attention. The SEC is always on stand-by, and Congress takes DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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up  issues  that  deeply  affect  the  economy  or  the  opinion  polls.  These  possibilities 
confine the range of state lawmaking and, on occasion, condition it. 
I  have  here  sketched  a  public  choice,  institutional  analysis  of  the  federal-
Delaware relationship. The structure privileges state-level deals between managers and 
investors in Delaware. Although managers historically  have had the upper hand in 
Delaware, they don’t fully dominate there.  Delaware doesn’t let them dominate fully, 
not just because of, or perhaps even in spite of, state competition.  It doesn’t let them 
dominateor they themselves choose to be moderatebecause if it did, the game 
could move to Washington, where new players could induce new results.  Hence, local 
interest groups compromise and local decisionmakers are evenhanded, even if local 
politics doesn’t demand compromise or evenhandedness. 
Sometimes, despite local compromise, the issue is so biggenerating headlines 
in the media and fears for the economythat it attracts federal attention.  Different 
coalitions can, and do, emerge at the federal level. Sometimes the managers or the 
investors  find  new  coalition  partners  at  the  federal  level  and  thereby  break  the 
Delaware deal.  Delaware limits the range of the first decisionmaking stage by keeping 
out corporate outsiders and public policymakers. Sometimes managers and investors 
can make their deal there and then unite at the federal level to fight off other forces. 
Sometimesprobably more often than nottheir interests are sufficiently similar that 
they both want the states and not the federal authorities to make corporate law.  But 
sometimes Delaware loses control of the agenda.  It loses control when the public is 
sufficiently motivated that Congress acts because the economy is weak or because 
scandals dominate the media.  Congress ousted Delaware most recently with Sarbanes-
Oxley after the Enron and WorldCom scandals hit the headlines. 
*   *   * 
Look what we have done here.  We’ve reversed the conventional analytic form 
for  Delaware,  in  which  the  making  of  public  law  governing  the  corporation  is 
analogized to a market, one of competing states.  We’ve turned that inside-out, into a 
public law perspective of interest groups and political institutions.  Instead of seeing 
Delaware as solely the upshot of a market of competing states, we see it as also like a 
federal  agencycaptured  by  its  interest  groupsthat  can  only  move  as  far  as 
Congress allows.   
By thus viewing Delaware, we have uncovered rich public choice explanations 
for  the  core  nature  of  Delaware  and  American  corporate  law.  While  these  public 
choice explanations don’t let us precisely explain statute after statute or exact judicial 
holdings,  they  mark  off  the  broad  boundaries  of  corporate  lawmaking.  We  have 
explained  Delaware’s  moderation,  Delaware’s  dominance,  and  the  conservative, 
boardroom-centered  nature  of  American  corporate  law  via  federal-state  interaction, 
without  relying  solely  on  the  state-to-state  race  for  franchise  tax  revenues.  We’ve 
reinterpreted the state corporate franchise tax as excluding many players from making 
corporate  law.  We’ve  shown  how  Delaware’s  structural  differences  with  Congress 
arise not merely from the presence or absence of competitors, but also the differing 
interest groups and ideologies that affect each. We’ve seen how the internal affairs 
doctrine reflects deference to some interest groups and not others. And we’ve seen 
how the Delaware-federal sequence is an agenda-setting structure.  DELAWARE’S POLITICS 
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Delaware is just a state, embedded in a federal system that has more going on 
than just interstate competition for charters.  It has only two senators and only one 
representative. Delaware law can be replaced and its acts can risk reversal and ouster at 
the federal level, by Congress, by courts, and by the SEC.  Each of these institutions 
responds, however clumsily, to its own voters and inputs, and those inputs are not 
identical to those that are powerful in Delaware.  Delaware can usually create the 
initial rule, to which the federal players react, but it can’t uniformly control the final 
results in making American corporate law. 